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EDITORIAL

WE publish today in Miscellanea the first half of a summary of the Jerusalem Conference Report kindly compiled for us by Dr. Prideaux. Though the Conference was held eighteen months ago, its findings will not be out of date for many years to come; and it has seemed to us that it would be useful to our readers to have them before them in the convenient compass and inexpensive form of a synopsis in this journal. Many of the facts and problems dealt with have been familiar to students of missionary expansion for the past twenty-five years; but the rapid growth of world communications (of which the recent flight of the Graf Zeppelin is perhaps the most startling example) has steadily increased their significance and urgency. Study of the Conference, while it quickens hope in many directions, deepens our regret that the Church of Rome was not represented at it. The Roman Catholic Church is easily the greatest missionary Church in the world, and no survey of missionary work will be complete until their contribution is made to the discussion.

Dr. Lowther Clarke's Note on *The Shorter Anglican Missal* printed below represents a point of view with which we are glad to associate ourselves. Church-people, we believe, demand two things of their liturgy: first, that the main structure of the rite shall be uniform, and, secondly, that it shall be said in an audible voice. Given those two principles, there is not much objection to variety in detail or difference of degree in ceremonial. The publication of this Missal seems to make it desirable that the 1928 liturgy should be made available in a form convenient for use at the altar. There are many practical difficulties in the way of the use of the new Canon; but most of the rest of the new service (together with the special Collects, Epistles, and Gospels) would be welcome both to clergy and people.

GOD AND THE WORLD-ORDER*

I PROPOSE in this paper to discuss three questions. I want, first, to ask how far the non-religious knowledge of the world, based on sense-experience and elaborated by the various sciences, justifies the belief in a world-order. I want to ask, secondly, whether, failing such justification on non-religious evidence, religious experience can supply the deficiency; and, particularly, whether the assurance of God that is given directly in that experience admits of translation into the forms of human knowledge. For, unless we can do this, and make intelligible statements about God which express truly what we experience in immediate contact with Him, we have no basis from which to infer from our knowledge of Him to knowledge of a world-order. Thirdly, supposing that we are able thus to formulate the truth about God and His purpose, a further question arises as to the relation between religious and non-religious knowledge. We have to ask whether the facts of the world disclosed by the sciences are or are not reconcilable with the beliefs in God and a world-order derived from religious experience. I shall be occupied mainly with the two first questions; on the third, which links my paper up with the main subject of this Conference, I shall touch more briefly at the close.

I

How far does non-religious knowledge yield evidence for the belief in a world-order?

Let me begin by noting the bearings on this question of the belief in God. If the belief in God be true, the truth of a world-order follows from it. God, as the Absolute Reality, is the sole source of all being; and the world as His creation is through and through dependent upon Him. A world thus dependent upon God for its nature and existence must needs be an ordered world. We could thus infer a world-order indirectly, from the same evidence that serves to justify the belief in God. But I do not think that the facts of non-religious knowledge are sufficient to prove God's existence. The most famous of the historical arguments to God's existence, that known as the Cosmological, concludes from the contingency of the world and all that is therein to a necessary Being as its cause. It is not, however, a valid proof of God; for it gives at best a transcendent Absolute, an unknowable x , of which reason assures us *that*

* A paper read at the Conference of the Anglican Fellowship, July, 1929. The writer is indebted to Dom Cuthbert Butler's *Western Mysticism* for the rendering of many of the quotations in Part II. of the paper.

it is, but as to *what* it is is wholly silent. Philosophically, however, this argument is stronger than the far more popular argument from design, founded on the signs of purposive order in Nature. The contingency is all-pervasive. The purposiveness is partial and fragmentary. Moreover, it is the disorder in the world, rather than the order, that provokes to the thought of a God transcending it. A perfectly ordered world, in which apparent irrationality and evil were reducible to reason and good, would be self-explanatory and could furnish no basis for Theism. But such manifestly is not the world we know. In our everyday experience, events occur in a seemingly quite disconnected and haphazard fashion. A thunderstorm breaks just as my train arrives at Paddington; some one is being murdered in Afghanistan while I am lunching in Piccadilly; I stand with my guide-book on the spot where Cæsar conquered Ariovistus 2,000 years ago. These spatio-temporal coincidences, making up the bulk of the data of our experience, strike us as a madness without a method. Certainly there are exceptions—obvious periodicities and repetitions, of life and death, night and day, seasons and tides; the days of a man are, very roughly, threescore years and ten; hunger can be satisfied by food, thirst by drink; but the strands of coherence are few and far between, and, in comparison with the mere coincidences, may be regarded as uncovenanted mercies. We fix attention on them, because they are so rare and yet so vital for the conduct of life. Moreover, being strangely reasonable in our make-up, we feel an innate partiality for order and cling to it, when we can find it, with tenacity. We are scientists from the cradle, moved by an unquenchable desire to discover in the apparent chaos the realm of reason and law.

Do we find it? The question is not simply how far the faith in reason, which has been from the first the guiding star of science, finds progressive confirmation within specific fields of our experience. What we are asking is whether, in the light of scientific analysis, our experience discloses an intelligible unity, whether we are entitled to speak of the world as forming a world-order. The points I shall briefly summarize will suffice to show the gulf that parts, and must ever part, this ideal of scientific knowledge from the actuality.

1. Physical Nature is a series of events in Space and Time; and our mental life is a temporal history. Whatever view we may adopt as to the nature of Space and Time, they imply, indeed, a certain order or orders of arrangement, but an order that is for ever incomplete. We cannot conceive a beginning or an end of the spatio-temporal series. Hence everything that happens in Space-Time points beyond itself and is con-

ditioned by something else. We seek to explain event A, and the search carries us indefinitely onwards, till we realize that any one event implies every other, and that to know A would mean to know the spatio-temporal world as what it is not and cannot be, a whole. This is the contingency which, as we noted above, drives reason to posit an unconditioned ground of explanation above and beyond the world.

2. Physical Nature is found to conform more and more, in its movements and behaviour, to laws that admit of precise mathematical formulation. For the mathematical physicist, individuality is the skeleton at the feast. It exists but to be explained away as an instance of universal law. Yet, even in inanimate nature, there is found that which is recalcitrant to such resolution. Science is beginning to wonder whether individuality may not be discernible in the atom; whether one atom of hydrogen behaves exactly like any other; whether the atom, to speak in free popular language, may not after all have a will of its own. When we pass to living organisms, and onwards to the higher animals and man, the claims of the individual become more and more insistent. The world cannot be interpreted, save in certain abstract characters, in terms of mathematical order. For in such an order there is no place for contingency, or for differences of quality, or for the creativity of the evolutionary process, or—which is yet more serious—for values.

3. Can the concept of purpose supply the deficiency? Can it be that the world is ordered, in its wealth of concrete detail, on an intelligible plan? The thought is plausible, for many reasons. A purposive plan—*e.g.*, a work of art or a coherent policy—is unique, and allows for individuality and qualitative differences in its details. The artist or the man of business realizes his purpose through particular acts, each of which contributes to the execution of the design. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern have their point, as well as Hamlet, in the scheme of Shakespeare's play. Again, a plan requires for its realization a certain measure of uniformity in the materials with which it works; so that a purposive explanation seems to account alike for the individual and the universal features in experience. How could the sculptor express his idea, if marble were not uniform in its behaviour? or the statesman, if geographical conditions were capricious? Further, purpose implies an end and is therefore not indifferent to value. A purposive order could not merely account for the facts being what they are, but could justify them as contributory to good.

The instances of purposiveness, not only in human actions, but in infra-human nature, are manifest and arresting. Think of the eye and its complex adaptation to vision, of the spider's

web, of the acorn that grows into the oak. Such phenomena evoke, prior to any explicit reasoning, the sense of a mysterious power informing them, a feeling of wonder and awe, akin to that which Otto has named the feeling of the "numinous." This is why the argument from design, for all its inconclusiveness, has made and will always make a stronger appeal to mankind than any other of the proffered arguments for the Being of God.

4. But it is a far cry from the recognition of specific instances of purposiveness to the assertion that the world in its entirety exhibits a purposive system. There is purposelessness in Nature and even in man as well as purpose. Moreover, the purposiveness that is discoverable is riddled by defects and limitations. For non-religious knowledge, it remains an ideal which is never actualized in fact. This will be evident from the following considerations.

(a) The realm of inanimate nature lies outside the purposive order. "The stars in their courses blindly run." The suggestion, put forward above, that purpose needs for its execution materials which are mechanical and purposeless in their behaviour, merely illustrates the inherent defects of the finite purposes that fall within our experience. When we turn to living organisms, we are confronted on all sides by waste, and, in sentient beings, by pain. Pain, indeed, allows in some degree of purposive explanation; in so far, that is, as it has stimulative or protective value. But the explanation is partial, and the cases of purposiveness stand out like islands of civilization in the midst of a sea of barbarism. Nor are the various purposes harmonious. Though what is called the "struggle for existence" works, as does human competition, through peaceful co-operation as well as war, the facts of evolution disclose no sign of a unified system of purposes. We find everywhere "the broken arc," never "the perfect round."

(b) But, it may be said, the world is no ready-made structure; we must take long views, and seek the world-order as the eventual consummation of its age-long travail. Already, in the course of cosmic history, life has emerged from matter, sentiency from life, self-consciousness from sentiency; and who can set bounds to the upward *nisus*? But with what right do we look to a consummation of a temporal process that by its nature allows of no completion? Does not science itself predict the reversal of the line of progress, and the gradual extinction of mind and life upon this planet? The true scientific gospel is to be read, not in the visionary dreams of a terrestrial millennium, but in the stern pages of Mr. Bertrand Russell's essay on "A Free Man's Worship." Apart from faith in God,

the long view yields no clearer assurance of a world-order than the short.

(c) In the field of human action, purposiveness is most evident and most intelligible; but it is there also that its limitations are most apparent. Human purposes are intelligible, because we can point, as we cannot in the case of lower organisms, to the mind that frames and executes the purpose. They are the expression of rational thought, and we need not to use phrases such as "implicit" or "unconscious" purposiveness to veil our ignorance of the purposing subject. Yet human purposes are infected, within and without, by incompleteness. Viewed inwardly, they are the product of reason working on non-purposive materials—our own nature and environment; schematic in intention, in execution they remain for ever unfinished, pointing beyond themselves to fresh purposes in a sequence that defies fulfilment. Above all, they lack coherence one with another, alike in the life of the individual and in his relations with his fellows; and bear fruit in personal rivalries, the economic strife of classes, and international wars. This conflict of purposes grows more pronounced with each advance of civilization. Knowledge and goodness bring not peace only but a sword. Neither science nor history reveals the magic formula to reconcile the indefinite multiplicity of discordant wills.

(d) Finally, on the human plane we are confronted with the gravest obstacle to belief in a world-order, in the facts of suffering and sin. That human suffering serves as a stimulus to self-preservation or as discipline for character or as the natural consequence of wrong-doing furnishes but a partial solution of the problem. "Did this man sin, or his parents, that he was born blind?" There is baffling disproportion within the life of the individual between virtue and happiness, vice and misery. Pain can worsen character as well as purify it. The existence of sin and moral evil strikes yet deeper at the faith in a purposive world-order. For these arise within the field of purpose itself, showing that rational beings can will deliberately evil as well as good. Doubtless experience testifies that evil tends to issue in disillusionment, that bad actions owe such coherence as they have to the immanence of something good, and that deeds of disvalue furnish materials for other valuable purpose. But here again the evidence is imperfect, nor does it avail to annul the terrible actuality of the evil will. Non-religious experience gives slender warrant for the faith in redemptive purpose. At most, the "is" and the "has been" of fact stand condemned by the consciousness of an "ought," which is an unrealized ideal.

There is order in the world, but a partial and fragmentary order—such is the ultimate verdict reached by way of non-religious knowledge. The belief in a world-order, if it is to prove more than a mere regulative Idea, must be grounded on the knowledge of God. And God, if He be known at all, must be known by way of religious experience. We are brought here to the second of our three questions.

II

Does religious experience give knowledge of God, knowledge, that is, of a kind which can be set alongside of non-religious knowledge as a datum for rational investigation?

Religion brings to those who enjoy it an assurance of God's presence that is, at least in the moment of enjoyment, final and sufficient. But not even religion, to say nothing of philosophy, can rest content with the trust born of personal acquaintance. The direct experience of God cannot, any more than other direct experiences, be accepted non-critically at its face value. The problem is not, you will notice, that of the genuineness of the experience. For this, we may have recourse to practical verification, pointing to the effects of the experience in the lives of those who share in it. These are seen to be, for the most part, not crazy fanatics, but persons of sound judgment, who order their affairs with wisdom and exhibit an exceptionally clear insight into other men's characters and into the finer bearings of situations of fact. Great saints and mystics, such as St. Augustine or St. Teresa, display qualities of thought and action which, if their interest had been fixed on worldly ends, would have enabled them to control a flourishing industry or guide the course of a nation's policy. Even in the humblest walks of life, religious men and women are found to possess a contentment and harmony of temper that diffuses itself insensibly around them, illuminating their own lives and strengthening them to face crises, in which others would be overpowered by despondency, with a glad acquiescence in the will of God. To the impartial observer, religious experience presents the very characteristic that distinguishes, to the eye of the psychologist, veridical from illusory apprehension. The one fits in with coherent behaviour, the other does not.

No: the difficulty before us is rather that of translating this experience into the forms of rational knowledge. Does it admit of statement in propositions that can be examined and utilized by the philosopher and the theologian? In other words, is a theology possible?

Two things must here be borne in mind:

1. The activity of reason is not confined to the processes of logical inference. Inference implies as its basis a knowledge that is immediate and intuitional. Whether this intuitional basis be perceptual or intellectual, reason is already at work in the intuition. The goal of reasoning, again, is to transcend discursive processes in an act of intuitive vision. It is therefore a grave error to regard the vision of the saint or mystic as non-rational, on the ground that it betrays no trace of inferential reasoning.

2. The masters of religious experience claim with unfaltering unanimity to enjoy intellectual apprehension of God's presence. The utterly transcendent is revealed, though "in a glass darkly," to the mind of the worshipper. Moreover, the intellectual aspect is primary, rather than the volitional or the emotional. To speak of these experiences as states of feeling or even of desire is wholly to misconceive their nature. The key-words are Knowledge, Wisdom, Illumination, Vision, above all Contemplation. Exclusion of sense-imagery, tranquillity from emotional excitement, entire passivity of will are the essential conditions of the vision of God. "The soul raised up to itself understands its own measure, and recognizes that it transcends all earthly things, and from the knowledge of itself passes to the knowledge of its Maker." So St. Gregory; and St. Augustine writes in his Confessions (vii. 16), "I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul, above my mind, the Light unchangeable . . . that light, whereby the soul is so enlightened that it beholds all things truly the object of the intellect. For that light is God Himself." St. Thomas makes very bold, declaring (*S. c. G.*, iv. 18) that "the Holy Spirit inhabits the mind by His substance." For all these, the *amor Dei*, realized in the highest moments of contemplation, is *amor Dei intellectualis*.

Here lies our difficulty. It seems as though this intellectual vision were parted by an insuperable gulf from any assertions about God, by which we may endeavour to interpret it. For, if God be transcendent, above and beyond the world of His creation, He must in His essence be incomprehensible to the human mind. How could the Unconditioned be comprehended by the conditioned, the Absolute by the relative, the Infinite by the finite? The religious consciousness unhesitatingly affirms His transcendence, recording its experience as that of the wholly Other, the *mysterium tremendum*, in presence of whose annihilating majesty the worshipper and the world around him become as dust and ashes. It is not merely that He is ineffable, indescribable in human speech: He transcends the utmost power of human thought. The only way open

to man's intellect is that of the *docta ignorantia*, the learned ignorance, the *via negativa* or *remotionis*. He is not this, not that, not anything determinate; for all determinate being is contracted and finite; He is above knowledge, to be known only in the knowledge that He is unknowable. Thus the sole true theology is negative; all affirmative statements about God are false. They merit Dr. Johnson's trenchant criticism of Jacob Boehme, "If Jacob saw the unutterable, why then did he attempt to utter it?"

Now we cannot rest content, any more than could Boehme and the mystics, with this purely negative position. It is agreed by all the great Christian doctors, except, I believe, by St. Augustine in one or two precarious passages, that man cannot know God's essence in this present life. But all are equally at one in recognizing, side by side with His transcendence, God's immanence in the world, and, above all, in the soul of man. "Thou art more inward to me," wrote Augustine (*Conf.*, iii. 11), than my most inward part." Since God is the fountain of all being, His image and superscription must be discernible, mediately and confusedly, in the creation which is the product of His agency. When once we are assured of His existence, we can draw conclusions as to His nature indirectly, by way of analogy, passing from the finite to the infinite, from effect to cause. We can affirm positively of Him that He possesses, in an "eminent" manner, the perfections—wisdom, power, goodness, etc.—which we discover imperfectly manifested in His creatures. Thus the theology of negation is supplemented by an affirmative Theology, resting upon analogical inference.

I confess that this time-honoured way of escape, developed with great precision by St. Thomas and generally accepted by Christian theologians, leaves me with a grave sense of dissatisfaction. It suffers from a radical defect. Apart from the assumption, inherited from ancient Platonism, that the effect bears necessarily the stamp of likeness to its cause, the very application of the causal relation to God's creative agency is highly questionable. How can we express or even conceive the relation between the Creator and the creature? Analogical argument derives its value from identity of relation. As 2 is to 4, so is 4 to 8; here the analogy is perfect, for the pairs of terms are identically related; two is the half of four, four is the half of eight. But what identity of relation, what determinate proportion, can there be between finite and finite on the one hand, and finite and infinite on the other? God differs from man and from all that falls within man's experience, not in degree merely, but in kind. His wisdom is not as our wisdom, nor His goodness as our goodness. Man *has* wisdom

and goodness—*i.e.*, he participates imperfectly in these perfections; God *is* these and all else that He is in unbroken unity. How then can we discriminate among the analogies that men in all ages have used in thinking of God? What criterion have we for selecting the more fitting from the less fitting? If we look to revelation for the criterion, how are we to choose between the claims of alternative and conflicting revelations? Moreover, even revealed truth is, in Newman's phrase, an "economy," couched perforce in the language of imperfect analogy. "I believe in God the Father Almighty." Fatherhood is manifestly a metaphor; Omnipotence a finite attribute raised to the *n*th power, and when so raised negative rather than affirmative in import. "I believe in the Trinity in Unity." It is not necessary to be a theological expert to realize that the Three and the One are not the numerical three and one of our school arithmetics. The way of analogy lands us in a dilemma. If we press the analogies home, we fall into anthropomorphic mythology, construing God in the likeness of finite man; if we stress the *eminenter* and the difference in kind, the analogies lose their positive meaning and we are back once more in the negative theology.

Is there not a way out of this impasse? What is required is a concept, generated in direct religious experience, which is applicable both to God and to man univocally, and not analogically—applicable, that is, with identity of meaning, and which gives positive expression, not indeed to God's essence, but to His activity in relation to the world and man.

Can such a concept be found? I believe it can, and that the concept is Love. I suggest that Love can be affirmed of God with positive meaning, without the qualification implied when we ascribe to Him such other attributes as Wisdom, Power, or Goodness. These, as we have seen, can only be predicted of God *eminenter*, and by imperfect analogy. With Love it is otherwise. God's knowledge of man and man's knowledge of God differ not only in degree but in kind. They are different as knowledges, and the difference is strictly incommensurable. But God's Love for man and man's love for God differ not in kind but in degree. The concept in both cases is univocal. Therefore the statement "God is Love" involves no economy or compromise with finite experience. It is the expression of unambiguous truth. Doubtless God *is* Love, while man can at most *have* love for God. But I am speaking here not of God's essence as Love, but of His manifestation of that essence in the Love He *has* towards man. Moreover, the identity of meaning and relation holds not between God's Love for man and that of man for other finites, but between God's Love for

man and man's love for God and for Him only. The ground of the identity is that in the experience of loving God man is literally more than finite, that the experience is not of the effects of God's causality but of the transcendent God Himself indwelling in the human soul. The Spirit of God illuminating the intellect "raises," in St. Gregory's words, "the mind above itself," so that it catches "a momentary perception of the unencompassed Light, as if through a chink." In this illumination, the infinite ceases to be unknowable and becomes accessible to the knowledge of finite mind.

I can appeal for support to the record of one of the greatest of Christian mystics, of the saint whom Dante singled out, as the supreme master of the life of contemplation, to disclose the final vision of the Trinity in Unity in Paradise—St. Bernard, the great St. Bernard, Bernard of Clairvaux. In one of his later sermons on the Canticle, he discourses of the spiritual marriage of the soul with the Divine Word, in a love wherein the soul attains a perfect "conformity" and "loves Him as it is loved by Him." "The perfect correspondence of wills," he declares, "makes of two one spirit. Nor is it to be feared that the inequality of the two who are parties to it should render imperfect or halting in any respect this concurrence of wills; for love knows not reverence. Let one who is struck with dread, with astonishment, with fear, with admiration, rest satisfied with honouring; but all these feelings are absent in him who loves. . . . The soul that loves, loves, and knows nought else. . . . Love, then, is a great reality. It is the only one of all the movements, feelings, and affections of the soul in which the creature is able to respond to its Creator, though not upon equal terms, and to repay like with like. For example, if God is wroth with me, may I be similarly wroth with Him? Certainly not, but I shall fear and tremble and implore pardon. But how different is it with love! . . . Rightly then does the soul renounce all other affections, and devote her whole self to Him alone who is Love, because she can make a return to Him by a love which is reciprocal. . . . Not with equal fullness flows the stream of love from the soul and the Word, the Bride and the Bridegroom, the creature and the Creator. . . . Although, being a creature, she loves less, because she is less; nevertheless if she loves with her whole self, nothing is wanting where all is given. . . . In the words of St. Paul, 'He that is joined to God is one spirit' (Cant. lxxxiii.)."

If this contention be true, we are enabled to take a further step, and affirm whatever is implied therein as to God's relation to the world and man. It is of the nature of love to be *diffusivum sui*, self-diffusive; to go forth from itself as Other, to give of itself

freely in creation, while abiding in itself unchanged, uncircumscribed, without increase or diminution. We know this in the reciprocal experience of God's love for man and man's for God, and *in that alone*. The love of finite beings *for one another* furnishes no more than an analogy. Secondly, though the creature, being the manifestation of God's creative love, is of necessity less perfect than its Original; yet, by the nature of love, it is drawn upwards to union with its archetype as its connatural end or good. Here is the clue to the reconciliation of Divine transcendence and Divine immanence. God is the A and the Ω , the source and goal of all being other than Himself. Moreover, the concept of Love affords a touchstone for the analogies drawn from the perfections which we find imperfectly mirrored in the finite world. We can ascribe to God *eminenter*, by way of economy or metaphor, all such predicates and no other as are consistent with His creative and binding Love. Thus we interpret His timeless creative act, causally, as a creation *ex nihilo*, which, spread out in time, covers the continual conservation of the world throughout its history. Again, we interpret it, *faute de mieux*, under the analogy of a purpose, that unfolds itself for human experience in a temporal succession. Such a purpose must be envisaged as characterized by harmony and coherence, the hall-marks of spiritual activity within our experience. It must be rational, with the inherent rationality of Love. The world is necessarily conceived as, in the Divine intention, a world-order.

III

We have seen that, for non-religious knowledge, the world is no unified system, but a plurality of individuals with conflicting natures and interests, a medley of order and disorder, rationality and unreason, good and evil. We have seen that, for religious knowledge, this same world is in its entire structure and history the expression of a purposive order, which has its source in Divine Love. Can these two views be reconciled? Are the facts of science consistent with the claims of religious knowledge? Or do they stand in contradiction, so that human reason is divided against itself?

This brings us to the problem of evil, the theme of discussion at this Conference. To that problem, as you are well aware, no final solution can be offered. Finite minds cannot comprehend in its fullness the infinite purpose of God. It is more than doubtful whether such an insight, were it vouchsafed to us, would further man's spiritual vocation. There is deep truth in Kant's reflection, that the unsearchable wisdom of the Author

of our being is displayed no less in what He has denied to us than in what He has granted.

I shall not do more, in this closing section of my paper, than indicate the well-beaten track along which theologians and philosophers alike have sought an answer. I simply want to illustrate how the known evil in the world is, in principle, compatible with the knowledge of God's creative love. Our concern is with the intellectual aspects of the problem, not with the practical; save in so far as these are occasioned by the former. Of the three modes in which evil presents itself, imperfection or finitude, suffering, and sin, I shall speak only of the first and last. The problem of pain, human and infra-human, is far too complex for cursory treatment.

1. The world, as the effect of God's activity, must needs be less perfect than its Creator. Else how could it be other than Himself? He is infinite, but it is finite; and its finitude is doubly evident, in the plurality of created beings and in their subjection to time and change. God alone is One, eternal and unchanging. Now, if plurality be once assumed, we can see how its gradation in a hierarchy of beings more or less perfect in their nature heightens the value of the whole. If all created beings were of uniform type, there would be monotonous repetition, and, as in a work of human art, the whole would suffer through lack of qualitative variety in the parts. That "man is not a fly" or a fly a man, that the lily is not a rose or the rose a lily, that Velasquez possesses powers other than those of Beethoven or Newton, subserves the excellence of the world-order. We must bear in mind what Dr. Moore has called "the principle of organic unities"—viz., that the value of a complex whole may be incommensurable with the several values of its constituents. Many imperfections in man and nature would vanish, could we view things, as we conceive God to view them, not from the circumference, but from the centre. The point must not be pressed unduly. It fails palpably to account for moral evil. That moral evil, for instance, ministers in the event for good cannot justify it as evil, or make the wrong act right. Nor, if the individual be of intrinsic worth, can we acquiesce in his utter sacrifice for a perfection in which he can have no share.

The other mark of imperfection is that the world has a temporal history. You may remember St. Augustine's answer to the man who asked what God was doing before He created it. "He was making a hell," said the saint, "for people who ask foolish questions." Time, in Plato's phrase, is "the moving image of eternity," and, like space, belongs not to God but to His creation. Hence the world-order must be conceived,

not as a static masterpiece, but dynamically, as the temporal unfolding of a timeless purpose. The evolutionary process, despite its cul-de-sacs, its retrogressions and its conflicts, appears as the painful travailing of the creature to work out the potencies implanted in the cosmic germ by the Divine mind. Thus only can we give an intelligible meaning to the unconscious purposiveness in nature. The faith in a progressive *nisus*, for which non-religious knowledge affords no warrant, commends itself to reason as the corollary to faith in God.

2. Moral evil and sin in man, coming as they do among the latest fruits of a history that claims to be directed by God's loving purpose, present the gravest of all obstacles to Theism. Their stubborn actuality, at all events within the temporal process, precludes any attempt to explain them away as illusion, or as error, or as mere privation of good. They imply, not merely such defect in the parts as may be atoned for by the perfection of the whole, but positive self-assertion by the finite individual, in rebellion against the divinely appointed order. They are due, not to ignorance or to the blind impulses shared by man with the brute creation, but to the abuse of what is highest in his nature, his reasonable soul. If we can reconcile the existence of these destructive powers with God's all-embracing Love, the problem of evil will be shorn of half its speculative terrors.

Let us clear our minds of a common and very natural misconception. It is easy, as Bishop Butler long ago observed, for a critic to complain that God, moved by pure benevolence, should have endowed man with capacities that would ripen spontaneously into virtue and have placed him in a world so fashioned as to secure the certain coincidence of goodness and happiness. The idea appeals strongly to the plain man, who, contrasting it with the facts as he finds them, is led to question the belief in Providence. But the imaginary hypothesis is, in truth, not only fantastic, but self-contradictory.

It is fantastic, for it ignores the fact that men, and, in their measure, all living organisms, are not mere machines, even in the hand of God, but are possessed of an inward power of growth, and are thus far under their own control. They are, in short, individuals. This individuality is most strongly marked in man, who can rule his conduct in the light of rational purpose. As a moral being, he is, within limits, free to act, and absolutely free to choose. There is nothing here derogatory to Divine Omnipotence. The creation of beings with a life of their own and the power of moral action is a far greater marvel of Almighty Wisdom than the creation of the most flawless of automata.

Further, the hypothesis is self-contradictory. How can

the purpose of creative Love be contracted within narrower bounds than the spiritual perfection of the creature? Happiness is not the final end for man. I do not question what both to Plato and to Kant appeared self-evident, that a world-order wherein moral goodness and happiness were ultimately divorced would be repugnant to reason, and therefore no world-order, but world-disorder. But the value of happiness is conditioned by that of the spiritual activity, which alone has intrinsic worth. If, then, the end of creation be the fashioning of the creature to the likeness of the Creator, freedom is implied as the necessary condition of its realization. The fashioning must be, in some measure, self-fashioning. A moral character imposed *ab extra* by a creative *fiat*, or achieved otherwise than by the free effort of beings endowed with the capacity of choice, is a contradiction in terms. A "moral" automaton would not be moral at all. Freedom of choice means freedom to choose evil as well as good. If a free being chooses evil, the responsibility rests upon him, not upon God. Θεός ἀναίτιος.

Such, in its simplest outline, is the time-honoured line of solution, familiar to every student of theology and metaphysics. It is the only line of solution open to the thinking mind. It leaves, as I premised, many problems unanswered. Of these, some are more verbal than real; that, for example, of reconciling human freedom with Divine foreknowledge. The term foreknowledge, taken strictly, begs the question; for God's knowledge is above time. His knowledge, which is His will, covers all—"not one sparrow falls to the ground without your Father"—including the gift of freedom and all that follows from it. God's causality permits of secondary causes, and of these some are free. The freedom, again, is relative, and in no way precludes God's immanence in, and co-operation with, finite human wills. Freedom and grace alike are gifts of Divine love.

Of greater significance, at all events for the philosophers, are two speculative questions bearing closely on the problem of evil. The first is that of Time. Evil and pain are alike relative to the temporal process. How that process, with its inherent limitations, can reflect God's perfect and timeless act of Love baffles our understanding. But it is clear that theology can never join hands with any philosophical system that denies the dependence of temporal happenings on a reality above and beyond time. The second question is that of Individuality. We have noted its emergence at nearly every point in the enquiry. I need not remind you how that enquiry has been prejudiced, from the days of the prophet Ezekiel onwards, by the deep-rooted tendency to interpret human experience individualistic-

ally. In their zeal to vindicate the moral responsibility of the individual, men have shut their eyes to the truths of corporate responsibility and vicarious suffering. Individuality, too, admits of degrees; and, even in man, appears as promise rather than as achievement. The problem of pain in infra-human organisms, for instance, cannot be met without consideration of the grade of individuality to be assigned to them. Once more, the question is raised, together with that of time, in any discussion of survival after death. The view of the present life as a state of spiritual probation implies the infinite worth and destiny of the individual. You will not expect me, at the close of a long paper, to embark upon these deep waters. I mention them simply as illustrating how the difficulties which beset the problem of evil exist, not merely for the Christian theologian, but for every serious student of philosophy.

Philosophy, alone of the sciences, takes all experience for its province. Within experience the facts of religion have as clear a title to be reckoned with as those of sense-perception or moral conduct. It is the merest prejudice that would restrict the scope of philosophy to non-religious knowledge, or exclude God and the world-order from its purview. The philosopher, it is true, starts from the world and man, striving, in the strength of an intellectual faith, to piece together the fragmentary materials of the sciences and of history into a coherent system. But it is in religion alone that he can find the clue enabling him to attain his goal, to transcend the limitations of scientific and historical evidence, and to ground his faith in a world-order on the experience that God is Love.

W. G. DE BURGH.

A SOURCE OF DEUTERONOMY

ALTHOUGH there has of late years been so much renewed discussion of the Book of Deuteronomy in various aspects, we have not observed any adequate treatment of an aspect of that book which received a good deal of attention from older commentators. We refer to the obvious fact that many parts of the book, not only the hortatory introduction (i.-iv. 40, v.-xi.) but also other parts, as, for instance, portions of chaps. xii. and xvi., profess to belong to an actual address delivered by Moses just before his death to the assembled tribes in the plains of Moab. As this cannot be considered to embody actual facts, it has been felt that the adoption of this fiction by the author of Deuteronomy amounted to a pious fraud by means of which he sought to obtain sanctions for his proposed reforms which

they would not otherwise have possessed. We think that few students have not at one time or another felt the force of this difficulty. Every time the book is reperused it presses itself on the attention of the reader, and so the spiritual beauty it possesses seems to be somewhat chilled and impaired by this obviously incorrect statement as to its authorship. Those who have tried to popularize the results of critical studies of the Old Testament to persons not hitherto acquainted with them have found themselves confronted with the same difficulty: "The book professes to be—but it is not—written by Moses." And indeed it is a phenomenon of some interest, as showing how widespread this feeling is, that in recent years the actual Mosaic authorship of the whole book or of parts of it has seriously been maintained by such scholars as Naville and Löhr.*

In dealing with this apparent assertion of Mosaic authorship it is customary to say that the book is essentially Mosaic—a logical and consistent application of Mosaic principles—that all Hebrew legislation was derived ultimately from Moses, being based upon a continuous Mosaic tradition, and that ancient writers permitted themselves much freedom in composing suitable speeches for historical characters. The author, it is said, places Moses upon the stage and exhibits him, pleading with the degenerate Israel of Josiah's day.† While by no means denying the validity of these propositions, the present writer has never been able to regard them as disposing (for him) of the difficulty. The original Deuteronomy—which we consider to be essentially chaps. i.-xxvi., freed from antiquarian and other interpolations,‡ certainly claimed to be of Mosaic authorship, lost for a time—and authoritative when it was found. The notion has been generally abandoned that the book was an invention of Hilkiah and the Jerusalem priests, smuggled into the Temple, where they pretended to find it. In fact, with regard to the country priests, the enactment of xviii. 6 f. was entirely contrary to the wishes of the Jerusalem priests, and they were successful in evading it (2 Kings xxiii. 9).§ Concise as is the story in 2 Kings xxii., it is quite clear from it that the King, the High Priest, the officials, and the prophetess at once recognized the book when found as a book of authority, of whose existence they were aware and as an authentic and binding Torah,|| which really implied a book claiming the authority of Moses.

* Budde, *Deut. Z.A.W.*, N.F., 1926, p. 228.

† Driver, I. C. C., *Deut.*, pp. lv-lviii; Budde, *v.s.*, p. 223.

‡ See Eerdmans, *Deut. O.T. Essays*, 1927, p. 79.

§ Kittel, *Gesch.*, ii. 2, pp. 535-6; Budde, *v.s.*, p. 197.

|| Notice the article *סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה* (2 Kings xxii. 11).

More fruitful seems to be the suggestion that there had been once in existence a traditional writing giving an account of a final legislative address delivered by Moses in the Steppes of Moab,* and that this document was available to the author of Deuteronomy—was, in fact, one of his sources. The author of this traditional writing must have been a gifted and industrious man who collected from verbal, perhaps also from written, sources all that he could find of Mosaic traditions current among the people, and gave these in the form of an address which, according to his tradition, was really delivered at the end of Moses' life. If the facts justify us in assuming that such a work existed and was (with other sources) used by the author of Deuteronomy as material for the hortatory portion of his work, and for the way in which he expresses many of the laws, the difficulty to which we have alluded disappears. The author of Deuteronomy would really think that Moses had said the things he found in the older records—perhaps, indeed, though we are quite unable to test the matter, some of them may have been really Mosaic sayings.† So any idea of *mala fides* disappears. We think it worth while to consider whether any of the phenomena of Deuteronomy i.-xxvi. confirm the idea that such a source lies behind them. We know that in the historical retrospects Deuteronomy made use of the books J. and E. It will be our object to see whether the evidence gives reason for thinking that another or Mosaic-tradition source was also used by the author.

1. The Mosaic point of view at the historic moment at which the address is supposed to have been delivered is perfectly maintained. It is almost impossible to find any real anachronisms which betray a later origin in chaps. i.-xi. Among the few we have noted, ii. 12 assumes that the Israelites had already taken possession of the land; iii. 14 speaks of the villages of Jair as so named "unto this day," which denotes a time later than Moses: x. 9, "Levi has no inheritance" (so xiv. 27, xviii. 1, 2), would seem to refer to a later period. But it is surprising how few cases of this kind there are and how the time-atmosphere is maintained. The constant allusions to the Egyptian servitude as a recent horror (i. 31, iv. 37, 46, v. 6, 15, vi. 12, 21, vii. 18, viii. 14, ix. 7, x. 20, 22, xi. 3, xiii. 10, xv. 15, xvi. 1, 3, 12, xvii. 16, xxiii. 7, xxiv. 22, xxvi. 6) speak strongly for the Mosaic tradition. It is natural that the

* See Driver, *op. cit.*, p. lxi; Westphal, *Les Sources*, p. 278 f.; Oettli, *Kzgefassl. Com. Deut.*, p. 17.

† We may ascribe to Moses the original short Decalogue (see Kittel, *Gesch.*, i. 5 and 6, p. 383; Volz, *O.T. Essays*, pp. 29-30), but not any amplification of it; perhaps also the noble words of the *Great Shema*' (vi. 4, 5).

great leader should have this event as a constant background in his mind. The casual allusion to Miriam (xxiv. 9) seems more suited to the Mosaic tradition than to a writer under the late Judæan kings. The mention of the mountain of the Amorites (i. 7, 21, 44), of the Anakim (i. 29, ix. 2), and of Amalek (xxv. 17-19), belong to the age of Moses, when the persons named existed as real extant people with whom Israel was concerned at that time. They are in the right period in that tradition, while in the time of Deuteronomy they had no significance. Similarly, the seven Canaanite nations who were to be destroyed (vii. 1) are carefully enumerated by name in the Mosaic tradition because in the time of Moses they were of real importance to Israel, and injunctions to destroy them meant something at that time—they were greater and mightier than Israel (iv. 38, ix. 1). In the time of Deuteronomy nothing about them was of any moment. The history of the careful avoidance of the territories of Moab and Ammon (ii. 16 f.) dealt with events of recent importance in the time of Moses, and properly took up a position of prominence in the Mosaic tradition. But at the time when Deuteronomy was written all the circumstances were so entirely different (see Jer. xlviii., xlix. 1-6) that these old traditions had no longer a living interest for the Judæan writer—they belonged to a different cycle of thought. The rebellion of Dathan and Abiram (xi. 6) was a matter of great importance in the Mosaic tradition—the whole authority of Moses was at stake; it was a matter of little or no interest in the period of Josiah. Even the rule of exclusive central sanctuary is quite in harmony with what little we know of Mosaic practice during the passage from Egypt to the plains of Moab. There was no official sanctuary except the sacred Tent containing the ark (Exod. xxxiii. 7-11; Num. xi. 26-27, xii. 4). We are expressly told by prophets* that no sacrifices were offered by or required of the people during the wilderness journey (Amos v. 24; Jer. vii. 22). Probably some were regularly offered at the sacred tent: otherwise, as Deuteronomy (xii. 8) observes, people did "every man whatsoever was right in his own eyes." Even during the long sojourn at Kadesh (Num. xiii. 26, xx. 1-14; Deut. i. 46; Judg. xi. 17) it is not to be supposed that the people were in the oasis; they were probably widely dispersed in the country around. But the sacred headquarters, tent and ark were there,† and we hear of no other sanctuary. So while the law of exclusive central sanctuary in Deuteronomy was new and enacted "at the time for the

* Wellhausen, *Gesch.*, 5, p. 18.

† See my article, "Levi, the Curse and the Blessing," *Holborn Review*, April, 1927, p. 183.

time,"* the practice of it falls in with the Mosaic tradition, and the enactment is in harmony with that tradition. Generally, if a written Mosaic tradition be assumed, these chapters in Deuteronomy embrace just the topics and the point of view which might be expected from it, and hardly any inconsistent with it.

2. The language and style of Deuteronomy are very material to this discussion. This subject has been so fully and satisfactorily treated by Driver† that we shall be content to adopt his results for our purposes. Every one can feel how striking and beautiful this style is: "Particular words and phrases consisting sometimes of entire clauses recur with extraordinary frequency, giving a distinctive colouring to every part of the work. In its predominant features the style of Deuteronomy is strongly original, entirely unlike that of P. and very dissimilar to the normal style of J. E." In Driver's list of the most noticeable words or phrases characteristic of Deuteronomy, comprising seventy instances but by no means covering anything like all the linguistic peculiarities of the book, sixteen only (and some of those doubtfully) are ascribed to the influence of J. E. But it really hardly requires such detailed analysis to prove that we have here something quite different from the style of J. or E. The reader feels it at once. This "flowing and impressive oratory" has some quality which makes the parenetic portions of Deuteronomy some of the most delightful reading in the whole compass of Old Testament literature. So powerful and compelling is this style that it was employed by the pious scholars of the Exile and the Return when they took in hand the editing and spiritualizing of the old national stories, especially the books of Kings.‡ Now we know that the author of Deuteronomy used as sources both J. and E., including the codes of law contained in E. and the legal work known as H.; but none of these sources explain the style of Deuteronomy, which can be best accounted for by supposing the use of some other written source; and, looking at the contents and point of view of Deuteronomy as described above, we suggest that this source was the written Mosaic tradition. For we cannot fail to note one feature common to all the phrases which constantly recur (as iv. 1)—they are all pervaded by an attitude of eager expectation of the promised land and assured hope that by Divine help they will attain to it. Such hopes and the phrases which embody them are eminently suitable to the Mosaic tradition and quite out of keeping with the period when Deuteronomy was written.

* Budde, *v.s.*, p. 222.

† *Op. cit.*, pp. lxxvii-lxxxviii.

‡ See Burney, *Kings ix.-xv.*; Kittel, *Gesch.*, iii., 193

3. It is a well-known fact that in the historical retrospects of Deuteronomy there are differences of representation from those of J. E., and additional facts are related which do not appear in those sources. Some examples may be given under each of these heads.

Differences.—Chap. i. 9-13 differs from Exod. xviii. 10 f. In J. E. the appointment of judges is suggested by Jethro. In Deuteronomy it is proposed by Moses himself. Chap. i. 22 differs from Num. xiii. 1. In J. E. the mission of the spies arises from a command of Jahweh to Moses. In Deuteronomy it is ascribed to a request of the people. Chap. i. 29 differs from Num. xiii. 30, xiv. 6 f. In J. E. Joshua and Caleb encourage the people. In Deuteronomy Moses does this. Chap. i. 39 contains a statement: "Jahweh was angry with me on your account," which does not appear in J. E. at this point of time, but (if at all) about thirty-seven years later (Num. xxi. 12). Chaps. i. 46, ii. 1-6 imply a continuous abode for about thirty-eight years in Kadesh, with some wanderings about Mount Seir. J. E. take a different view, according to which, after a short sojourn in Kadesh, the people turn back into the wilderness by way of the Yam Suph (Num. xiv. 25), and appear a second time in Kadesh at the end of the wanderings (Num. xx. 1, 16; Judg. xi. 16). Chap. ii. 5. According to Deuteronomy there must be no war with Edom. J. E. foresee a time when Edom will be a "possession" of Israel (Num. xxiv. 18). Chap. ii. 29 implies a free and friendly passage through Edom. J. E. (Num. xx. 18-21) differ, their view being that this was refused by Edom under threat of war. Chaps. iv. 12, v. 4 differ from J. E. (Exod. xix. 19, xx. 19). In Deuteronomy God speaks directly to the people. In J. E. He speaks through Moses.

Chap. v. 6 f. Very important differences between J. E. and Deuteronomy are to be found in the filling or amplification of some of the original short clauses of the Decalogue.

Fourth Com. In the text Deuteronomy reads שְׁמֹר for יָכוֹר, and adds (ver. 12), "As Jahweh thy God commanded thee," not read by J. E. Deuteronomy also adds (ver. 14) instead of "and all thy cattle" (Exod. xx. 10), "thine ox and thine ass and all thy (other) cattle"; and "that thy slave and thy slave maid may rest like thyself." Deuteronomy also inserts, instead of Exod. xx. 11, an entirely different reason for the appointment of the Sabbath—namely, the Egyptian deliverance, which, as observed above, is a leading thought of the assumed Mosaic tradition.

Fifth Com. Deuteronomy has two clauses not in the text of Exod. xx. 12: "As Jahweh thy God commanded thee," and "that it may go well with thee" (ver. 16).

Tenth Com. For one of the words, תַּחֲמֹד, Deuteronomy uses . . . תַּתְּאוּהָ. It names the "wife" before "the house," and adds to the objects coveted "his field" (ver. 18). There can be no doubt that we have here a different recension of the amplified Decalogue from that given in Exod. xx.

Chap. ix. 9. Deuteronomy represents Moses as fasting during his *first* sojourn in the Mount. J. E. (Exod. xxxiv. 28) ascribes this to his *third* sojourn.

These examples seem sufficiently to prove the existence of differences. We turn now to some examples of *additional facts* given by Deuteronomy.* Such are:

I. 16-17. Moses' counsel to the judges.

II. 2-7, ix. 18, 19. Israel forbidden to make war with Edom, Moab, and Ammon.

II. 26. Messengers sent to Sihon from the wilderness of Kedemoth.

II. 29. Edomites and Moabites sold food to Israel.

II. 33. Sons of Sihon slain.

III. 4, 5. Description of Bashan.

III. 21, 22. Encouragement of Joshua.

III. 23-28. Moses forbidden to enter Canaan.

IX. 20, 21. Facts about Aaron and the golden calf.

X. 8 f. Separation of the tribe of Levi.

X. 9, xviii. 2. Levi to have no inheritance.

XVII. 16. Israel not to return to Egypt.

XXV. 18. How Amalek cut off stragglers.

The deduction to be drawn from these differences of representation and statements of additional facts seems to be sufficiently obvious. The author of Deuteronomy, among his other sources, had a source from which he derived these traits. He acted as every historian acts, combining his sources and taking from each what seemed suited to his purpose. We may be sure that he did not invent these differences and additions, but took them from some source just as he took other matter from J. E., and the character of these differences and additions is such that they are very suitable to have been derived from the written Mosaic tradition we have postulated.

4. The assumption that there was such a written source of Mosaic tradition may help us to understand a question which has caused much doubt and discussion†—viz., the reforms of Hezekiah (2 Kings xviii. 1 f., 22). While we consider it safer to leave out of consideration for this purpose the statements in 2 Chron. xxix.-xxxi., we can see no reason to doubt

* See Driver, *u.s.*, p. xviii.

† See Wellhausen, *Comp.*, 3, 289, *Gesch.*, 5, 133; Burney, *Kings*, p. 337; Kittel, *Gesch.*, ii., 2, 496-9; *Camb. Anc. Hist.*, iii., 388.

that Hezekiah removed some *Bamoth* at any rate in Jerusalem and some *Masseboth* and an *Ashera*, and destroyed the serpent of brass. What, we may ask, led the King to take these measures? Partly, no doubt, the utterances of Isaiah and Micah (see Jer. xxvi. 18), partly the doom of Samaria (see Mic. i. 7); but we suggest as a possibility that the appearance of the book of Mosaic tradition may have made upon Hezekiah something like the impression which Deuteronomy made upon Josiah. Something more than prophetic denunciation, which had been going on since the days of Amos, seems necessary to account for these activities of Hezekiah; and this publication of an address, which was believed to contain words of the venerable legislator of Israel, could not fail to be a powerful stimulus to Hezekiah to take practical measures (whatever their extent) to put into practice the commands which he believed to be by Moses. Of course, nothing of this sort can be proved, but perhaps such a conjecture accounts for the action of Hezekiah in a more satisfactory way than any other theory.

These considerations, taken together, have a cumulative effect, and do seem to make it a possible and a not unreasonable hypothesis that there was such a written source, that it was known to the author of Deuteronomy, that he made use of it, and that it coloured his style and had an effect upon his representation of historic events. It cannot be said that the very meagre record in 2 Kings xxii. 8 f. gives much help in considering this question. Surely Shaphan must have said more to the King than the few words, "Hilkiah the priest has given me a roll"!* The really surprising fact is that the King at once accepted this book as an authentic Torah. Is it possible that he knew something of the written Mosaic tradition and recognized some elements of its style and contents in the roll now read to him? But it is best to abstain from conjecture on this difficult topic. The record is undoubtedly authentic,† but it fails to answer any questions of this kind.

We have offered an hypothesis, and our proof that such a source was used by Deuteronomy can only rest on the literary phenomena which we have tried to set out. We refrain from conjecture as to who wrote this source or when or why—or how or where it was preserved, or whether any of its contents were in any sense Mosaic. We shall be more than contented if we have made it seem likely that such a source existed. And we shall not be much perturbed by Budde's observation that in the impulses which have led to this discussion the feeling and judgment of laymen have unsuitably mixed themselves up

* In ver. 10, before *לְהַקְרִיא*, Luc adds *περὶ τοῦ βιβλίου*; Burney, p. 356.

† Gressmann, *Z.A.W.*, N.F., 1924, p. 321.

with the work of historical enquiry.* Whether the present writer is to be accounted a "lay" person in these matters is for others to determine. The feelings he avows he has had for many years, and he knows that they are shared by other students, but he ventures to claim that the methods he has adopted in this essay are not *laienhaft* but critical. If, without departing from sound principles of historical enquiry, he has made it seem probable that such a source as he postulates was used in the compilation of Deuteronomy, such a conclusion will certainly be none the less acceptable because it involves the consequence that this noble and spiritual book has no longer over it a shadow of ill-faith or mystification.

W. W. CANNON.

THE PERMANENT ELEMENT IN THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF ST. FRANCIS

THE story of the life of St. Francis of Assisi is fast becoming a matter of general knowledge rather than the possession of a few scholars and enthusiasts. That there is a wide thirst for knowledge is evidenced by the almost alarming number of books which have been tumbling into the world during the last thirty or forty years. Historians, theologians, social reformers, art critics and journalists have all turned their attention to this remarkable man, who has thereby risen to such a height in the popular esteem that many have flown to him expecting to find in his teaching a panacea to cure all the evils of the world. Others, young and fervent spirits, have been thrilled by the life of the saint, and are crying: "That's the life for a man like me!" and only wait for some young Francis to give them the lead and show them the way. It is therefore not to the specialist that I would now address myself, but to those who are demanding a "message" from St. Francis, and are perhaps receiving no clear reply.

St. Francis trusted far more to action than to the written word, so that our best authorities for knowing him are the earliest records of his life rather than his literary remains, which probably do not represent him either adequately or accurately.

If we turn to the record of his life, the first event which catches our attention is his so-called conversion or renunciation. It seems to me evident that when he broke away from "the

* *v.s.*, p. 222.

world" and his former manner of life he had no idea of what the future would bring. Any idea of founding an Order, or reforming social conditions, or even of bringing the Church to a realization of her duties, seems to have been totally absent from his mind. His one purpose was to obey Christ literally both in His life and in His personal mandates to Francis. Thus his building of the churches was his response to a formal command, his service of the lepers was an attempt to conquer his own shrinking horror and repugnance, and his renunciation of his inheritance was done in order that he himself might be free to serve his Lord and Master and not that the poor might benefit thereby.

Let us then be quite clear that in his early years Francis was thinking of himself and how he could lead a more perfect life: he was as yet unaware of his power to communicate his own ideals to other people. But he soon found, apparently to his surprise, that other men (and women also) began coming to him asking to be allowed to live with him and to share his life. That Francis was at first shy of admitting them is shown by his recourse to that rather unsatisfactory method of opening the Gospels at random to find out the "Will of Christ"; but a little band inevitably gathered round him, so putting him in an entirely new and unpremeditated position. Hitherto he had been a hermit making the world his cell but responsible for himself alone; now he became a leader of men and responsible for their souls and their behaviour. Having had no idea that events would take this turn, Francis had no policy prepared, and he shrank from the responsibility of authority. The sixteenth chapter of the *Fioretti* shows us the conflict which was going on in his mind, forcing him to choose between a life of prayer and meditation and a life of ministry among men. Fearful of trusting to his own judgment and his own prayers, he besought the devout Brother Silvestro and the holy Santa Chiara to pray for guidance on what he rightly saw to be the critical choice of his life. The answer was unanimous in favour of a life in the world, ministering, preaching, converting, leading the brothers in the "Way." The "personal" element which we have seen to be the primary factor in the first few years of his *conversio* is now subordinated, and Francis becomes to the brethren the *Padre Santissimo*, and to the people simply *Il Santo*. Had St. Francis taken the other path he would now probably be classed among the great mystics of the Church, and in an age of action few would have cared to know him. But as the "friar," the *pater pauperum*, the converter of kings and infidels, and the friend of every created thing, Francis has rightly captured the imagination of the age.

Francis was fully conscious of the problems of his day, and he attempted to show how the truly Christian life carries its own solutions. He was in no sense what many have called him—a “social reformer.” The problems which he had to face were, roughly, materialism and the alienation of Church and people combined with heresy. His method of solving them was to give men an entirely new outlook on God and on life, and this, not by damning the evils which he saw, but by calmly and unostentatiously doing what was right. Thus materialism he combated, not by denouncing the rich or even cajoling them, but by adopting for himself and his followers a life of abject poverty. But perhaps a worse evil than materialism was the alienation of Church and people: the Regulars being, by their Rules, cut off from intercourse with the outside world, while the Seculars were neglecting their ministerial duties to engage in litigation and other quarrels with the civil powers. Francis went straight to the people with his hands free to minister to them. Indeed, one of the reasons which he gave for a life of poverty was that possessions inevitably led to quarrels and lawsuits.

No one can deny that St. Francis’ life and teaching made a great difference to the world. He gave men an entirely new outlook on life and a new sense of God’s Presence, which was soon to show itself in the revival of culture which we call the Renaissance. He showed, moreover, that the Christian “Way” was not a mere ideal, but was something eminently practicable, that the commands of the Son of God could be taken as commands and not as pious suggestions, and that man *could* cut himself off from the world and rely upon God to sustain him. If St. Benedict showed the world the dignity of labour, surely St. Francis may be said to have shown it the dignity of poverty.

The problems which St. Francis had to solve—materialism and irreligion—are problems which belong to every age; his methods were those of Christianity. Does this mean, as so many have said, that if we were to do as St. Francis did we should be equally successful against the evils of today? And further, if we in England today are faced with problems which resemble those of thirteenth-century Italy, and if the solution of these is that a number of men and women should take our Lord’s commands in a literal sense, where does St. Francis come in? What is all this talk about “Franciscanism” and “friars” and “poverty,” when we have Christianity and the Gospels ever before us? After all, as we have said, St. Francis’ ideal was simply to be a replica of Jesus of Nazareth; why, then, are we so anxious to imitate the copy and not the original?

Let us, then, examine some of these points in greater detail. And first, how does the world today resemble and differ from the world of St. Francis? Writers of "popular" lives of St. Francis have, with the worthiest intentions, frequently drawn comparisons between the two. "The problems which faced St. Francis," they say, "are so like the problems which face us today that we can surely look to the saint for counsel and guidance." In so far as the main evils of his day are evils which belong to every age, this remark is true; but to assert that thirteenth-century Italy closely resembles England in the twentieth century, or to imagine that methods which were successful in one must, on *a priori* grounds, be successful in the other, is to show a grievous ignorance of facts and lack of common sense. We cannot blot out seven centuries of growth and discovery and treat them as if they had never existed. To mention but a few of the most obvious differences we might remember the growth of industrialism and city life, the disintegration of the Catholic Church, the expansion of knowledge and rise of atheism, intellectual doubts and the like, and the discovery of a New World. No serious thinker could for a moment imagine that the ignorant Italian peasant of seven hundred years ago had the same outlook on life as the sharp English artisan of to day, or that he was moved by the same arguments. Such an outlook is no better than that which regards England in the Middle Ages as a Utopia and wants to foist medieval ideas and standards on to an entirely different world which, for good or bad, has inevitably altered during the last six or seven centuries.

We shall probably go hopelessly wrong in our study of St. Francis if we do not make sufficient allowance for the lapse of time. We shall fail ignominiously if we attempt to introduce his methods wholesale into our work or if we attempt to model our lives in detail upon his life. Our business is to think out our own problems for ourselves and to let our lives be controlled by the same spirit of self-surrender and faith which governed his whole life of service. For example, St. Francis hoped to live by the labour of his hands, but when this failed he was happy to feed at "the table of the Lord"—*i.e.*, by begging his food from door to door. This was appropriate in an age that had no unemployment problem, and in which begging, far from being a crime, was a recognized mode of existence. Times have changed! Again, St. Francis in his preaching never argued doctrinal problems, and was strongly averse to his friars meddling in scholastic or doctrinal controversies. This, again, was satisfactory enough in an age which had no problems of "free thought" and unbelief, and when even the elements of education

were confined to the clergy and a few of the more ambitious townsfolk. Further, St. Francis went to the poorest people because they were entirely out of touch with the work of the Church, whereas our slums are often scenes of the finest, most self-sacrificing work that the Church is doing. Finally, Francis himself was impregnated with a medieval love of asceticism and a positive yearning for a martyr's death which we nowadays find hard to appreciate.

Poor St. Francis! We seem so far to have been putting him more and more out of reach, as a nurse puts a toy on a high shelf, exclaiming: "No, you shall not play with that; it's not good for you." But we have only done so because so many people, being intensely thrilled by his personality, have tried to drag him from the concealment of seven centuries and demand what they call a "message" from him. I feel that his "message" would be little more than that which he gave on his deathbed to the brothers standing around him: "I have done my duty, may Christ teach you yours"; though, if pressed, he might have permitted himself the words of St. John: "My little children, love one another." I doubt if we should find him more explicit.

But this assumed reticence of St. Francis need not detract from the magnificent example of his life. Every serious historian attempts to learn from the past, hoping to guide the present by the successes and failures of the past, for otherwise the study of history becomes the mere acquisition of knowledge. St. Francis is undoubtedly exerting a wide influence on the world today, both in England and in other countries, among those who give allegiance to the Bishop of Rome and those who do not. Many in this country are trying to discover how we may adapt the methods of St. Francis to our needs, to found an Order of friars in the Church of England or in some way or another to show our appreciation of the disciple of "Lady Poverty."

It is easy enough to be led away by the charm, romance, thrill (call it what you will) of St. Francis and to cry out: "Let's be Franciscans"; it is natural to human nature to show its appreciation in some practical way. But to such people I would cry: "Beware!" Let us first be perfectly clear what St. Francis meant and what his ideals were as far as we can recover them after the lapse of seven centuries. As I have tried to make clear, Francis was at first moved solely by *personal* considerations; we can therefore only be true disciples by building up our own spiritual lives independently of all that we associate with the life of St. Francis. By so doing we may discover ourselves by surprise, as it were, doing what he did,

and *then* we can say: "I say! this is just what St. Francis did!" and then we shall be "Franciscans," however unworthy.

But we can do more than this because, when all is said, Francis remains the great example of a life dedicated to God. In so far as a Franciscan movement would give to the Church of England a number of men (and perhaps women also), whose lives were wholly given to the service of Christ, governed by His rules as to poverty, simplicity, and humility, and guided by the faith which takes as its watchword *Dominus providebit*, it would be, perhaps, the greatest blessing of the time and the salvation of religion in England; but if it is to be little more than an *imitation* of what St. Francis did, if it is to attempt to copy St. Francis in small details—as, for example, what its members shall wear or eat—it will lack that most vivifying spirit, the spirit of originality. The more we study the life of St. Francis the more we shall be enabled to understand his spirit of complete self-surrender, and the more we shall be able to apply his principles to our needs. But Francis does not, and indeed cannot, hold a panacea for the evils of today: we must think out our own problems for ourselves.

I appeal, therefore, to all those who are crying out, "Back to St. Francis," to pause and consider. Remember the case of Brother John the Simple (2 *Celano*, 190), who copied St. Francis in every gesture—spitting, coughing, sighing, weeping; and when reproved by the saint said: "I have vowed to do all that thou doest; it were dangerous to omit anything." Let us beware of that lifeless thing: an imitation. St. Francis has set us the most glorious example, he has showed us that our Lord's precepts could be taken as commands and not mere aspirations, and he is saying to us now as he said before: "I have done my duty, may Christ teach you yours." What we want is inspiration not imitation, and it is *this* that St. Francis is supremely qualified to give.

J. R. H. MOORMAN.

A LOGICAL DEFECT IN THE ROMAN CLAIMS

By the Roman claims are understood the exclusive prerogatives claimed by the Roman Church in the decrees of the Vatican Council concerning the constitution of the Church. There is doubtless a minimizing sense in which an Anglican or Orthodox believer could accept these decrees; and this construction has been eloquently defended in *Irenikon*, vol. v., No. II, by the saintly Dom Baudouin, now Prior of the Monks of Unity at

Amay-sur-Meuse, who attended Cardinal Mercier upon his deathbed. In order to answer a possible objection beforehand, it may be well to point out that the article in question was written after the publication of the Encyclical *Mortalium Animos*, and, indeed, appeared in the same issue as that which contained an account of the submissive attitude of the Monks to that Encyclical. Side by side, however, with this minimizing sense is a maximizing interpretation, and this alone is almost universally presented by English-speaking Roman Catholics. This maximizing interpretation is consistent only with membership of the Roman Church, and naturally leads to that "traveling over land and sea to make one proselyte," which distinguishes our co-religionists in this and in Orthodox countries. Such avowed proselytism begets more enemies than it wins adherents, and its advocates would do well to study the testamentary dispositions of so cultured and Catholic-minded a man as the late publisher, Henry Cecil Sotheran, who directed in his will: "Although the Roman Catholic Church is, of course, part of the Holy Catholic Church of Christ, yet the spirit and method of Papal propaganda in England are such that I can do nothing which may help it." Moreover, this maximizing construction, by identifying the Roman Church exclusively with the visible Church on earth, is the greatest obstacle to the corporate reunion of separated Christians with the Holy See. If, then, we can show that this construction is untenable, we shall have achieved a work for reunion by making Roman Catholics fall back upon the minimizing sense, on which a basis for corporate reunion can be found. It is in this irenic spirit that this article is written and should be read. It is definitely wrong at the present time to indulge in religious controversy; or, at the least, those who so indulge should be licensed by the heads of their respective communions!

The chief and sufficient objections to the exclusive Roman claims are historical in nature. Not only is there no evidence for their existence during the first two centuries of our era, but there is evidence that the dominating theory was that of the Apokalypse 21¹⁴, according to which the twelve Apostles are the foundations of the Church. Especially significant are, on the negative side, the "un-Petrine" character of St. Peter's catechetical lectures to the Roman Church which we possess in St. Mark's Gospel, and, on the positive side, the claim of the Roman Church to a *double* Apostolic foundation at the hands of Peter and Paul, wherein Peter has truly a primacy, but only of honour; out of its own history is the Roman Church condemned! The historical objections to the Roman claims are set forth with remarkable acumen in Fr. Puller's *Primitive*

Saints and the See of Rome, and remain unanswerable. This is also the strongest ground of attack. It does not really matter what legally or logically minded people would like the constitution of the Church to be; all that matters is what constitution was given to the Church by Christ and what it actually has enjoyed throughout the course of its history. Certainly the Vatican decrees, if understood in a maximizing sense, were unknown to the primitive Church: and the declaration appended to them that they are "the ancient and constant opinion of the Church" (*vetus et constans opinio ecclesiæ*) is inserted either with a pathetic inconsistency or with a criminal levity; charity constrains us to the former acceptance!

But many Roman Catholics remain impervious to historical arguments. They are prepared to shut both eyes to the facts until Victor (c. 195 A.D.), and to open one only until Leo (c. 450 A.D.). This attitude has been fearlessly articulated by Cardinal Manning in *The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, where he says: "The appeal to antiquity is heresy and treason; heresy because it denies that there is a living voice in the Church, treason because it appeals from that living voice to something else." Such exponents of the Roman faith pride themselves that, entrenched behind an impregnable barricade of logic, they need fear none of the missiles of history; and from their stronghold they hurl charges of "Anglican muddle-headedness" at those outside the fold.

But are the Roman claims so logical? The object of the succeeding paragraphs is to demonstrate in the maximizing form of the Roman claims a grave logical defect.

The classical Roman "definition" of the Church is that given by Bellarmine: "The Church is a society of men united together by the profession of the same Christian faith, and by participation in the same sacraments, under the governance of lawful pastors, more especially of the Roman Pontiff, the sole Vicar of Christ on earth" (*De Eccl.*, III., ii., 9). But this does not really satisfy the demands of a definition proper, which must express in the minimum of language all that is essential to the thing that is being defined, without which it ceases to be what it is; it must bring in nothing extraneous or accidental. Now Bellarmine's statement is clearly too diffuse to be a definition proper; it is no more than a rough description. Clearly all the characteristics which it mentions are not equally fundamental, and it is obviously not intended that the absence of any single one invalidates a claim to be the Church. In contrast with the generous diffuseness of Bellarmine, English Roman Catholics of our own times, faced with the Catholic theory as taught in the Anglican Church, have seized upon communion with the Pope

as the one fundamental characteristic of membership of the Church, compared with which all else is immaterial. We are told explicitly that if we are in communion with the Pope then we are in the visible Church; while if we are not in communion with the Pope then we are outside the visible Church. They refer us to a test of Catholicism enunciated by St. Cyprian which appears at first sight to support this view; and they succinctly sum up their ecclesiological doctrine in the aphorism, *Ubi Petrus ibi Ecclesia*, in accordance with which the Pope is frequently styled "perpetual Peter."

Now it is just because the Pope, from the very nature of his office, cannot be "perpetual Peter" that this theory breaks down. But this is to anticipate. Let us note for the present that the definition at the back of the minds of those who make the statements quoted above, though they do not express it formally, is as follows: "The visible Church is the society of those in communion with the Pope." This statement does satisfy all the formal requirements of a definition. It proceeds *per genus et differentiam*; and it gives the essential characteristic of membership of the Church, neither more nor less.

But such a definition breaks down owing to the fact, anticipated above, that at times there is no Pope at all, and consequently, according to the letter of the definition, there is no visible Church at all, which is absurd. The reference is not to the Great Schism, in itself a sufficiently serious matter for the Roman apologist, but to the interval which elapses between the death of one Pope and the election of his successor. It is otiose to urge the necessity of communion with the Pope when there is no Pope. He who urges and he who is urged are in the same predicament; each is without a Pope, though for different reasons. Let us be sure that we have made our deduction correctly; if, as is asserted, the Pope is the sole necessary bond of unity in the visible Church, then the removal of that bond by death necessarily involves the collapse of the visible Church. This is absurd, and, as the deduction has been correctly made, the fallacy must lie in one or both of the premises—viz., the definition of the visible Church and the fact of intervals between Popes. Now it is an observable fact that Popes do die and that their successors are not immediately appointed. The error has therefore been traced to the definition of the visible Church; and we must either find a new definition which will grant the admitted perpetuity of the visible Church, or we must admit the impossibility of finding a satisfactory definition. But two other tasks lie more immediately before us.

The first is to show that in this, as in so many others, the Roman Church is but the heir of the Roman Empire. Hobbes

was very truculent in describing his "kingdom of darkness" as "the ghost of the Roman Empire sitting crowned on the grave thereof," but he has the right fact before his mind. Now Roman constitutional theory was faced with the similar difficulty that there was an interval between the death of one princeps and the election of his successor; and Mommsen, noticing this fact, penned the striking epigram, "The Roman principate died with the death of each princeps." As a matter of fact, the Roman constitution on the death of each princeps reverted to a Republic, and there was occasionally some inchoate talk of restoring a Republic in fact as well as in theory. In contrast with the Roman principate the English kingdom never dies because "the King of England never dies"; the death of one King is the elevation of another. But the Papacy, not being an hereditary monarchy, is in like case with the Roman principate. Now the principate indeed "died with the death of each princeps," but the Roman State remained; in the same way the Papacy truly "dies with the death of each Pope," but there abides the visible Church, whose existence is impaired but not destroyed if there be no occupant of St. Peter's Chair. The Roman State was more than the Roman principate, and the visible Church is more than the Papal adherents. The Papacy, in short, belongs to the *bene esse*, but not to the *esse* of the Church.

The second task lying before us is to counter the objections raised to the above reasoning by Roman Catholic apologists. One of these has already appeared in print. For a certain mission preacher, hearing the writer object to the Roman claims at a Society meeting, much as above, ventured to reproduce the substance of his argument in a popular Roman Catholic newspaper with an attempted reply and with the striking amplification that the propounder of the difficulty was "an enquirer, both candid and intelligent, but obviously distressed, who confessed that this was the sole consideration that kept him from joining the Roman Church!" The attempted reply consisted in saying that in the interregnum between Popes one's duty is to seek the local Church that was in communion with the Pope before his decease, and presumably will be in communion with the new Pope, and to get into communion with that local Church. But such a reply only gives practical directions for being received into the Roman Church, and these do not differ whether the Papal throne be occupied or vacant. It does not touch the heart of the matter—viz., the alleged necessity of being in communion with the Pope in order to be in the visible Church. But the reply has this merit, that, if pursued, it would run: "To be in the visible Church it is necessary to be in communion with some local Church." Now the stricter type of

Anglican would hold that the local Church in England is the Church of England, to the exclusion alike of non-conforming Puritans and "popish recusants." According to this strictly Anglican theory Roman Catholics in England would simply be members of "the Italian Mission" or "Dr. Ratti's Connexion," as is sometimes facetiously said. But a better and more charitable view would hold that the local Church in England split into two divisions during the reign of Elizabeth, and that these two divisions of the same local Church have existed coterminously ever since. The northern and southern kingdoms existed together in a similar state of mutual schism, and did not destroy, although they impaired, the unity of Israel, which is a type of the Church.

Another Roman Catholic to whom the writer propounded this difficulty concerning Papal interregna replied as follows: If there is no actual Pope, then it is necessary to be in communion with the potential Pope. Now a potential Pope is purely abstract; he is no more a Pope than an acorn is an oak. If one is in communion, mediately or immediately, with a Cardinal whom a two-thirds majority of the votes of his fellow-Cardinals is shortly to elevate to the supreme pontificate, then one is in communion with a Cardinal, but not with a Pope. A potential Pope is no Pope at all. Indeed, each human being is a potential Pope—although the chances of most people are infinitesimally small—inasmuch as he might decide to enter the Roman Church with all the wide vista of ecclesiastical promotion that would be thereby offered to him.

A French friend to whom the writer communicated this problem began with what seemed the drastically Anglican statement: "*Je crois que c'est le Christ qui est le chef et la tête de l'Eglise et que Pierre et ses successeurs ne sont que les représentants du Christ sur la terre. . . . Quands le pape meurt, le Christ reste la tête de l'Eglise*"; but this was balanced by the declaration, "*Pour appartenir a l'Eglise visible il faut être en communion immédiate ou médiate avec le successeur de Pierre.*" My correspondent then proceeded to deprecate the strict application of logic to the matter, and pointed out that there is no difficulty in practice, especially as care is taken that the election of a new Pope shall be undertaken as quickly as possible.

This is, in fact, the whole conclusion of the matter—the Roman system is such that practical inconveniences are reduced to a minimum. But it should be noticed that the Roman Catholics with whom we are familiar in England are not content with such a demonstration of practical superiority. They affirm the theoretical necessity of the unity of the Church owing to the person of the Pope. If such theoretical necessity exist, then

they are right in calling upon each individual to submit to the Holy See, and not to wait for the chimæra of corporate reunion. But we have seen that such necessitated unity of the visible Church in the person of the Pope is not compatible with the intervals between Popes. The Roman Church at such intervals is in precisely the same constitutional position as the Anglican Church—viz., a number of dioceses bound together by no very definable bonds of union. The unity of the Church has indeed existed throughout the ages, but it is not because it is a necessitated unity—else were our Lord's prayer *ut unum sint* otiose; it is rather a result of the providential care of God, who has never allowed the unity of the visible Church to be impaired beyond breaking-point.

It should be noticed in conclusion that the difficulty cannot be obviated by urging the necessity of communion with the Roman See instead of with the Pope. This step has the apparent advantage that the Roman See is a perpetual entity, whereas the Pope is not "perpetual Peter." It seems also to have been the line taken by Newman. But, as my acute French correspondent points out, a See without an occupant is an abstraction; and one cannot be in communion with an abstraction. Moreover, "the Petrine promises" were made to the person of Peter and not to the Roman See; and while one may grant that promises made personally to Peter were to be continued in his successors, it is impossible to grant that they were to be transferred to the Roman See. Since this is so, Roman Catholic apologists are not likely to relinquish the substance of "the Petrine promises" for the husks of logical rigour.

IVOR THOMAS.

WHAT THE WORLD IS ASKING OF THEOLOGY

WHAT has Jesus Christ for us today? What difference is it going to make in our lives if we adopt His standpoint? This is what men and women really want to know. It is because the answer is not clear that their attitude towards Christianity is one not, as is so often mistakenly assumed, of indifference, but of aloofness. Neither the difficulties of belief nor of practice hold them back. The Creed might bristle with all the antinomies of physical science, the Christian rule might be even more exacting than it is, neither the one nor the other would keep men and women from professing Christ if they had any idea why they should profess Him. It is undoubtedly as "hard to be a Christian" as the poet makes out, but mankind has

attempted things as hard when there has been clear reason why they should. The Modernist quite misconceives the situation if he thinks that the present attitude towards Christianity is due to the incredibility of the Creed or the superstition of Sacraments. The Modernist gives us credit for an academic sensitiveness which we do not possess. We have graduated in a university other than his, a university at once more ancient and more modern, ancient in its recognition of the primitive urge of life and modern in its absorption in the *res non delicata*. Our *alma mater* is a city not of "dreaming spires" but of belching chimney-stacks, for whose children reality is fiercely other than philosophical speculation or critical adjustments. The average man and woman today with instincts strengthened by this rough tutelage are not waiting for a sublimated Creed or a rationalized Sacrament in order to "accept Christ." They are waiting to know why they should accept Christ at all.

The aloofness of vast masses of our population who live, so to speak, on the borderland of the Faith, who are in touch at almost all points with Christian activities, Christian institutions, Christian influence, gives extraordinary significance and vitality to the Pastoral Letter issued recently by the Archbishops. That Letter reveals a Christian civilization once more unrelated to the standpoint of Christ. "The Church of Christ is called to give witness to the reality and claim of the things unseen and eternal. *How can it give witness to these things unless they are manifestly real and powerful in the lives of its members?* . . . Must it not be confessed that in many of our congregations there is a dulness of spirit, a languor of worship, a reluctance to make fresh adventures for the cause of God's Kingdom?" One could wish that what the *Times* characterized in its leader* as the "abstract idiom" of the Letter had been sharpened to more incisive phrase, and that the standpoint of Christ had taken the place of the "things unseen and eternal" which are not always patent to congregations afflicted with "dulness of spirit"; but there can be no question, on a considered reading of the Letter, what it really points to—viz., the imperative necessity of acquaintance with and faith in the *standpoint* from which Jesus Christ ordered His whole outlook on life, its duties, possibilities, limitations, joys, sorrows, and sufferings.

For if faith in Him is to "save"—in whatever fresh sense the hackneyed phrase come to have for us—it must be because that faith is informed by His values. Galilee must precede Nicæa. What the world is asking for, and what the Church must give the world, is not so much evidence for the Divinity of Christ as for the *finality* of Christ. We do not ask the world

* July 29, 1929.

to classify Christ; we ask the world to submit to Him. The world replies: "Why?" and the only answer that has any chance of "getting through" consists in lives submitted to the standpoint Jesus Christ disclosed. This demands an ever fresh acquaintance with the spirit and values of Christ as found in the Gospels. We have to go to school to Him continuously—not as persons qualifying in "higher religious education," not as mere brain-learners, but as disciples discovering, each for himself, slowly, painfully, yet with immense joy, the secret of His submission and triumph.

What else is the meaning of Christ's parting mandate to "make disciples"? The juxtaposition of μαθητεύσατε with διδάσκοντες in St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20 indicates a training quite distinct from imparted information, one similar in essentials to that by which the first disciples had graduated under the direct tuition of their Master. This part of the great commission stands parallel in importance with baptism and continuance in the observances Christ had appointed. Here, plainly, are two mandates: the one respecting incorporation into the life of the Church; the other, the cultivation of the Master's spirit. It is common to speak of the former as "institutional" Christianity, but surely both are equally "institutional" if by that term reference is intended to the institution of Christ. If the sacraments are reckoned as "institutional religion," so also is discipleship. In the great commission, indeed, the latter occupies the prior place. To the mandate to baptize and to teach the Church has unquestionably been faithful throughout the ages; but what about the mandate to "make disciples"? Has it received anything like as prominent a place in the trusteeship of the Church? The subject would prove a profitable angle from which to approach church history in one of those study circles which the Archbishops' Letter seems to anticipate. Meanwhile what of the Church today? Is there any attempt to "make disciples" of those who are being incorporated into the life of the Church?

Every year thousands of souls are in one way or another "recognized" as members of the Christian bodies. What real attempt is being made, in the various preparations for such recognition, to get them to put themselves to school to Jesus Christ, and to assimilate the life-values which He exemplified? Have the majority, *e.g.*, any idea that association with Jesus Christ means a radical difference in standpoint from the world—from "human society as it organizes itself apart from God"? Let us by all means avoid the language of the fanatic—a snare which no doubt besets our present subject—let us put it in the considered phrase of the Pastoral Letter, with which no student

of the times could disagree: "We are enclosed by a material civilization great in its achievements, confident in its self-sufficiency, in which no place is found for God, or even for the spiritual life of man." From the standpoint of such a civilization the standpoint of Christ is as far removed as it was from that of the Empire in which the Apostles delivered their message. Today, as then, human society, even with its tincture of Christian sentiment, is "organized apart from God," is in a state of unsubmission to the Father. Now the great disclosure of Jesus Christ, of His life, of His words and of His works, is one of submission to the Father, and of the possibilities of human life when exercised in like submission.

That this is not all Christ disclosed—that we need, in order to make that submission, the practical working law of our lives, His communicated mind and will—is a fact not to be lost sight of, but—one thing at a time—have we continually in mind the object for which His communicated mind and will are given? Do we realize that, in the apostle's phrase, if we have not the *mind* of Christ, if we do not share His outlook, if we do not bring to our own lives and to the world around us, to our own conditions and the conditions of those about us, the test of the Father's Will—as, for us, disclosed in the life of Christ—we are none of His? Is it from this point of view that the boy and girl, the man and woman admitted into Christian fellowship today, are taught to regard their association with Jesus Christ? Is it from this standpoint that they view the world's authority, its standards, rewards, and penalties? Is the Christian's first question, on contemplating any line of conduct: Can this be undertaken, as Christ would undertake it, in submission to the Father? Is the conscience so being trained that it responds automatically to Christ-values? In a word, are men and women being "made disciples"?

In the Post-baptismal Office, when the priest addresses those who stand sureties for the child's Christian upbringing, he invests discipleship with the seriousness of a "profession." "Our profession is to follow the example of our Saviour Christ and to be made like unto Him." That is one of the master-sentences of the Christian Church. Considering its active and passive aspects, it may be said that the whole of Christianity lies in it. Baptism is incorporation into the Christian Society, but without the co-operation of the baptized its significance is about that of an unendorsed cheque. What steps are taken to insure the endorsement? What are the ideas aroused in the average man when he is bidden "remember that his profession is to follow the example of Christ"? When did he consciously and deliberately enter upon such a profession? To what extent does he

consider himself pledged to Christ's example and precepts? To what course, *e.g.*, would his "profession" commit him in the event of an unjust decision on the part of his Trade Union? To what does his profession commit him in his daily association with those who laugh the young out of their religion and trample every Godward impulse under foot? What obligation does he feel it lays upon him in regard to prayer, self-discipline, worship, the sharing of his substance, the disposal of his time? And if the reminder of his profession, when one of its gravest responsibilities is required of him, calls up only the vaguest sense of obligation, who is responsible? What training has he ever had beyond a pre-Confirmation smattering of "religious knowledge" to prepare him for the tremendous profession of a disciple?

Perhaps in the above rough sketch too much stress has been placed on the disciple's attitude towards the world and not enough on the redemptive value of Christ's disclosure in the region of human limitation, suffering drudgery, failure—all that concerns our common life, including the creative energies of joy and love. Be this as it may, the fact that the life Christ lived has such values for all today is a matter of experience, though of experience sadly restricted. To utilize and extend this experience is the task of theology. By what method can it be achieved? The sermon is inadequate, so also is the lecture. Something may be done during the preparation for Confirmation, but experience of life and reflection upon it are necessary to the most elementary appreciation of the standpoint of Christ. The only conceivable method seems to be the one employed by Christ Himself—that of co-operative study under a convinced and inspiring leader. What else could He have had in view when He charged His Apostles to "make disciples of all nations" than a repetition under the guidance of the Holy Spirit of the method by which He had brought them to an understanding of His secret?

Is this what is adumbrated in the Archbishops' appeal for "some continuous study of the Gospel of God's revelation of Himself in Christ"—a training of the adolescent and adult understanding in the mind of Christ? One would fain hope that such interpretation of the Pastoral Letter is not wide of the original intention. If so, is it permitted to suggest two words of caution calculated to safeguard the subject from hackneyed side-issues into one or other of which, without the greatest care, such continuous study is sure to fall?

In the first place, it is not restatements of "the Faith" that are of primary importance. The need of the world will not be met by reiterated attempts to translate the facts and doctrines

of the Church into the idiom of our modern thought. Discussion of the problems of pain and evil, of the bearing of scientific discoveries on Biblical lore, no doubt have value in broadening the intellectual basis of the faith, and must to some incidental extent emerge in all deliberate attempts to assimilate the mind of Christ. But they are altogether of secondary importance compared with the main issue—viz., of applying the standpoint of Christ to the needs and conditions of today, of convincing men and women that Christ and His secret of submission to the Father have direct bearing on every detail of individual and collective conduct of our time.

The world grows weary to death of paper Christianity. If our difficulties were solved and our doubts set at rest and every fact and doctrine reduced to a demonstration, should we be any the nearer attaining the ideal which Mill instanced as supreme—viz., "so to order our conduct that Jesus Christ should approve our life"? Is it not a psychological error to concentrate on difficulties and problems by presenting solutions which rarely meet the individual conditions of those who experience the difficulties? At the best we may by so doing invest belief with a "fatal facility" by robbing it of the venturesomeness of faith which turns in the last resort on the finality of Jesus Christ.

The other side-issue into which continuous study may fall is of a more subtle kind. In seeking to ascertain the "mind" of Christ we may easily stop short in His "teaching." A couple of generations ago, when a reaction from dogmatic theology set in, regard for Jesus as the Teacher largely took the place of those other and more supernatural aspects of the Saviour which had occupied orthodox thought. A widespread interest sprang up in the application of the principles of the Sermon on the Mount to social and industrial life. Much of that interest is still maintained—at least, in thoughtful religious circles—sufficient to identify the "standpoint" of Christ with Christian ethics. Here is the danger, for in the world around us ethics are already outmoded. For good or ill the social revolution no longer wears an ethical guise, and the happy warriors who made their moral being their prime care are gathered and gone by together. This is not to say that the world is indifferent to right principles—when it shall have discovered them—but at present it seems to be reaching out after something bigger, more personal, more vital, than anything either dogma or ethics have offered. It emphasizes by its attitude the difference which it has been the purpose of this paper to express between the "standpoint" of Christ and His maxims, which are but a part of His standpoint, the consequences of individual discipleship

in relation to the life of the community. The difference may perhaps be made clearer if the reader is asked to imagine how grotesque would be the great saying of Renan: "Thanks be to Jesus, the dullest existence, the most absorbed by sad and humiliating duties, has had its glimpse of Heaven," had he said: "Thanks to the *ethic* of Jesus . . ." Powerfully as the Sermon on the Mount has affected civilization, it is safe to say that, except in its more tender passages, and then only as the disclosure of the secret of Christ, it has never re-inspired a broken life. If the appeal of Jesus centres in His teaching, the Man of Sorrows and of Triumph has nothing for the vast majority of mankind.

Disciples will be made neither by Christian evidences nor by Christian ethics. They can only be made in the significance of the words: "Come ye apart," "Learn of Me." What the world is asking of theology is to be brought into the immediate presence of the Master in all that He cared for supremely, to be brought close to His heart, His mind, His purpose. The approach to Jesus has probably never been wholly coherent, because men and women are unconscious how immense is their weariness, how many-sided their incompleteness, but they seek Jesus at the hands of theology exactly as they sought Him in His earthly day: they followed Him, they loved Him, they confessed Him *because He showed them how to live*. And we who believe that the same Heart yearns for us today in our elemental need must in love and patience lead our brethren into the secret of His submission and triumph.

One cannot better conclude so inadequate an essay than by a passage from a paper read by Mr. Cyril Bailey to the Conference of College Tutors and Schoolmasters at Oxford two years ago: "Teaching about Christ Himself must, I believe, start with Christ the Man, a man with infinite knowledge of man's nature and an unparalleled relationship to God. From that comes the recognition of something more than man in Him; but this, too, must be brought into relation with the working of God's Spirit in the individual, in the inspiration of the artist and the saint; and then, if that step is taken, the recognition of God's Presence in the world in a unique form will lead to a new understanding of redemption."

THOMAS J. HARDY.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

AMONG contributors to the present issue, Professor de Burgh is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Reading, and his article, like that of Mr. T. J. Hardy's, has a close bearing upon the subject of the Archbishops' Pastoral Letter. Mr. Cannon is known as the author of many illuminating O.T. studies, including one on the Song of Solomon and another on the 68th Psalm.

NOTES

A

THE JERUSALEM CONFERENCE (I.)

It may be said with much truth and without lack of modesty that historians of the year—shall we say A.D. 3000?—will look back to the present age as one marked by turning-points in many of the tendencies and movements which go to make up the progress of man. In so many departments of life is the old order changing and new groupings and new methods and new aims are revealing themselves, and this on a scale so unprecedented that no historical parallel can be found; for the first time a world-outlook and a world-movement is possible, and there is scarcely a race untouched by it, however primitive. In politics, domestic and international, in social development, in scientific attainment, we are living in a new era, in an epoch; and religion is not untouched by the same influences; alike in the attitude of men to religion in general, in the relations between religious bodies, in the attitude of one religion to another, in matters of ecclesiastical organization, a new birth has taken place and fresh ideas and practices are superseding the old.

Of this an illustration was provided by the meeting in Jerusalem in April, 1928, of the International Missionary Council. This body is itself a recent creation, the outcome of the conference of missionary bodies held at Edinburgh in 1910, and is symptomatic of the capacities and opportunities for united effort as well as of the co-operative spirit which characterize the religious life of the twentieth century. No fewer than fifty races were represented, and all the larger Christian bodies except the Roman. The delegates were united by one aim and profession, the service of Jesus Christ, and animated by one desire and spirit, to discover how under the new conditions that service can be most effectively rendered, and the Christian message brought to bear on the thought and life of mankind. Under the influence of such compelling unity goodwill was assured, and the experience, learning, and wisdom of all were freely offered for the benefit of the whole in their common task. The results of their deliberations have been issued in eight volumes, and their findings and recommendations will be of permanent value for at least another generation, particularly as regards their general outlook and principles, and it is the purpose of this series of articles to summarize as far as may be the contents of these volumes for the benefit of those who for any reason are unable to procure and study them for themselves.

THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE

The first volume deals with *the Christian message* and its relation to non-Christian systems of thought and life, and it recognizes that the changed situation of today and the new spirit of inquiry which is everywhere abroad demand a fresh study of the whole subject. It is satisfactory to find that strong emphasis was laid on the fact that Christianity is not so much a creed as a way of life, and on the claim that the Christian religion offers a more adequate solution of life's problems than any other Gospel presented to man. With this end in view we have papers on the four leading religions of the world—Judaism is excepted, probably because the issue and problem are different from the rest and were dealt with at special conferences held previously at Warsaw and Budapesth—together with a study of the secular, materialistic ideal which has so largely gripped the world; there are reports from the special sections; the discussion of the plenary sessions; three special papers on the religious values of the non-Christian religions, the evangelistic duty of Christianity, and the case for evangelization; and the final statement adopted by the Council. The ground covered is therefore very wide, and this volume, the largest of the series, extends to five hundred pages.

Discussing Hinduism, Dr. Nicol Macnicol says that it is, and always has been, ill-defined and amorphous, and at present is undergoing change and reconstruction. Its lower forms are negligible as religion, but its higher expressions offer an organized ceremonial, a philosophic appeal and a strong stimulus to religious devotion. It is now reviving its energies and becoming self-assertive rather than self-reforming; its motive has also changed, and it has taken on a strong nationalist colouring and a desire for social reform. The soul of Hindu culture as inherited from the past is described as reverence and gentleness to all living things, tolerance and peace of mind, and these demand from the missionary an attitude of respectfulness for personality, of disinterestedness, and of sincerity.

The aim of Hinduism is the "intuition of reality," but so far it has not often been linked up with experience. The ritual observances have a certain emotional value, as in all religions, but the system of caste is quite indefensible. Its Pantheistic outlook is not unmoral in its effects, but the ideas of *karma* and *maya* do produce a moral impotence. There is a marked contrast between the Hindu desire for deliverance from the world and unreality and the Jewish and Christian desire for deliverance from the evil that is in the world and from sin; these are not mutually exclusive or antagonistic views, but reveal a difference of outlook, the one finding the source of evil in a false vision, the other in a rebellious will; the problem before the Church is the reconciliation of these attitudes. The Hindu desires peace, calm, a sense of unity with the universe. The Christian is aware of a reality behind and embracing the universe, and Christianity offers power to overcome sin, to transform a rebellious will and bring it into harmony with that of a holy God. The contrast is between the intellectual and the moral, and of these the moral goes further and deeper into the nature of things. (Put in another way, the contrast is the same as that between all "natural" religions and Christianity—i.e., between the negative and the positive, between re-arrangement and re-creation.)

There are thus three contrasts between Hinduism and Christianity. The first is fundamental, in the conception of ultimate reality, between

Brahman (a neuter word) and God, the Father; between a doctrine of immanence alone and a doctrine of transcendence which does not preclude but is complementary to immanence; between acceptance of the actual and a striving after the ideal. The second contrast lies in the conception of salvation, between deliverance from world-entanglement and victory over world-evil; between what may be attained by man's own efforts and what needs divine intervention and co-operation or grace; between what is at best sub-moral, for Hinduism is being moralized, and what is wholly moral. The third contrast lies between a calmness of mind which may be merely lethargic, and the peace of soul which is the result of faith in a righteous God (and also we may add of moral victory).

There are undoubtedly some elements in Hindu thought which are found in Christianity, but they are less certain and definite, they are shadowy and abstract, and they need filling out and stiffening with a moral force and content. Hindu emotions need a similar control and focus—*i.e.*, the Person of Jesus Christ—to prevent them drifting aimlessly and even from becoming a moral danger. Both in mental outlook and in devotional power Hinduism has value, but in both it has also defects and positive dangers.

An appendix notes the existence of a popular Hinduism (*i.e.*, the equivalent of the popular Christianity of the Dark Ages), which is intertwined with the social system, often merely superstitious or merely conventional, and through which the human heart often breaks through, in spite of incompleteness and error, and produces fruit both noble and beautiful; this is seen frequently in home life and at times in a spirit of joy which refuses to be silent.

In the discussion much stress was laid on the Person of Jesus Christ and on the need of personal relation with Him. He is a living Saviour, personally attractive; India does not need philosophy or intellectual statement, but moral and spiritual life; this Jesus Christ can give, and it should come through the spirit of Christ, showing Christ's character in the lives of those who preach Him; India should be left to make her own interpretation of Him. The hindrances to Christianity lie in the lack of lives really Christian, in the institutional element in Christianity, in the "superiority complex" among Christians, in the Christian appeal to the untouchables, although this argument was felt to cut both ways, in the idea of Incarnation, in political and economic conditions created by Western peoples (*i.e.*, by those who have also brought Christianity), in secularism, in India's social system. Evidence was given of moral power in the lives of Hindus; opinion was divided as to how far acceptance of Christianity meant a break with past religious experience or was felt as a fulfilment.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The second volume commences with a long paper by the Rev. Dr. L. A. Weigle and Mr. J. H. Oldham, which deserves study by the home Church as well as by more directly missionary bodies, and it ought to be reprinted and widely circulated in pamphlet form. The writers call attention to the ignorance by the Church of the real nature of the educational process, and to the need of a new understanding of world conditions in order to make the work of education effective. Science has caused a revolution in social life and thought, and therefore in education, and there has been a revolt by the non-Western peoples against the Western; education is becoming

a national affair; all this challenges the Church to correlate her Gospel with the new knowledge. The tendency of modern education is to concentrate on the personal element both in teacher and pupil rather than on knowledge or skill, and to train the pupil as a personal being for the duties and conditions of life. Contact with the concrete natural world and with social relationships and reactions is essential, and with the pupils' own community life, which has not more than six leading interests: health, industry, citizenship, home, recreation, and religion. Pupils have to be trained to face an ever-changing world, and for this they need a scale of absolute values. The need of religion as an element of education is being increasingly recognized. The qualifications needed in a teacher are: a natural delight in helping youth to realize its highest possibilities, the power to understand human beings and to watch their growth, definiteness and stability of character, the grace of humour.

Discussing education in the light of Christian purpose, the writers point out that Christianity is also concerned primarily with persons; its aim is their salvation; it offers an objective revelation of values and life at its fullest; this life is developed through worship; God's will is the dominant purpose of life, and the love of God is expressed by the love of man; God's providence lies behind all human efforts, and life is inevitably social; the training of personality involves the elimination of sin, and therefore conversion and the work of the Holy Spirit. The close approximation of Christianity to the ideals and requirements of modern education is evident, hence attention must be concentrated on the knowledge, study, and presentation of the Bible, and on the curricula and syllabi, techniques and methods in present use, in order that they may be brought into line with current standards and needs; the home life and the school and the life of Church and community should similarly be brought under review. The Churches have a necessary part and place in national systems of education, and, given a larger and wider view, there is less risk of hindrance and opposition than there is hope of fruitful opportunity. Intenser religious devotion, closer and more continuous study of educational method, experiment, self-criticism, more careful training of teachers and of missionaries themselves, watchful and helpful supervision in schools, enlarged and better curricula and syllabi (and supply of literature)—these are what are needed today.

Comments are printed from India, Ceylon, China, and Japan which support the contentions of Dr. Weigle and Mr. Oldham, and give some illustrative detail. Ceylon also recommends discrimination in teaching the Bible; China calls attention to her peculiar circumstances and how recent events have given their witness to the value of Christian education; Japan urges the opportunity and the need for co-operative action. The discussion touches on the reasons why education and religion are at present separated; on our Lord's methods (a valuable contribution by Canon Raven and the subject of an article by him in the *I.R.M.* for January last); on the need to distinguish the essentially Christian elements; and on adult education. A useful bibliography is appended.

THE YOUNGER AND OLDER CHURCHES

Volume III. calls attention to the existing and growing autonomy of local Churches in the mission field. The preliminary paper is contributed by the Rev. Dr. A. L. Warnshuis, who discusses the nature of an indigenous

Church, the relation between it and a mission and the missionary agent, the financial aspects of both Church and the institutions usually connected with it, the question of training leaders; he points out the contrast between missionary ideals and methods past and present, and adds at length some attempts made by local Churches to define themselves and their own accounts of practical efforts at devolution made in various parts of the world.

These points are touched on repeatedly, and are dealt with in the account of the discussion and the Council's statement. The general conclusions are as follows: The idea of the Church is central in all mission work and as a spiritual entity, arising out of spiritual experiences and fostering spiritual life; the mission is therefore to be subordinated to this objective, and should gradually be transformed until it becomes a branch of the Catholic Church native to its own area; support, both in workers and in money, should after a time be gradually reduced until the local Christian community or Church can stand on its own feet, govern itself, frame its own policy, finance itself, provide its own ministry, and undertake its share of aggressive propaganda. This will, of course, vary widely in time and in method according to local circumstances. Financial aid in missions well-established is best given in the form of block grants for the local Churches to spend freely as they think fit. The foreign missionary should identify himself as much as possible with his converts, and be regarded more and more as belonging to the Church rather than to a mission; his work should be done in the spirit of partnership and fellowship—i.e., any sense of patronage or outside control should be eliminated—and his aim gradually to make himself unnecessary as native leaders come forward and are trained to take his place; as they "increase" so must he "decrease." But foreign missionaries will be needed for some time to come—this was freely recognized by native representatives themselves—for the sake of their knowledge and experience and to help in the problems arising out of contacts between the white and coloured races. The burden of institutions such as hospitals, schools, and colleges is, in many instances, too heavy for the local Church to take over at present; great care is needed lest elements, institutions, and practices natural to the older Churches of the West be unnecessarily foisted on to other countries; such care will often bring considerable economy in men and means; local conditions and practices should always be taken into account. The urgency of devolution and of reunion was acutely felt.

Archbishop Söderblom contributes a paper on "The Historic Christian Fellowship," and he characterizes the Church as both visible and invisible, human and superhuman, a missionary body, growing, varied, one, diverse and elastic. Jesus Christ was unique and the Christian revelation is supernatural. The Cross reveals both evil and God's Love. Archbishop Temple writes about the Church as the Body of Christ, one, but with a unity imperilled by its diversity of function, geographical situation, thought, temperament and race; he pleads for an international rather than a denominational unity, while hoping for both. Mr. P. O. Philip pleads also for spiritual revival, a ten to fifteen years' policy in the local Churches, a voluntary ministry, self-support, and large local control of the policies of institutions and literary activity.

The Council's statement adds the need of freedom in the method of training native leaders, and increased native Christian literature; it calls the Western Churches to more and developed prayer, missionary study

and education; it desires a stronger and better appeal to the younger generation, and suggests means how the missionary Churches may help the home bases. (Could there be anything better for the Church of England, we may add, than a "mission of help," say from India or Uganda, offering us the benefit of their spiritual experience?)

MISSIONS AND RACE-CONFLICT

is the subject of Volume IV., and papers are printed dealing with the three *foci* where the problem is acutest. Dr. John Hope outlines the history of the Negro element in America, noting their wonderful survival and cultural development and the efforts made on their behalf originating in Christian sources. The greater number live in the South, and their conditions vary as between North and South. Several hundred thousand served in the Great War, and their return revived the issue afresh; immediate points of friction were satisfactorily dealt with by a small group of Christian people, and out of the organization created for this purpose came the Commission on Inter-racial Co-operation. This is inspired solely by the desire to help the Negro people, who number twelve million in a democracy of a hundred and ten million (but, where coloured peoples are concerned, often more democratic in theory than in practice).

Dr. T. J. Woofter, jun., writes at length on the agencies for inter-racial co-operation in the U.S.A. with reference to the Negro. His rapid development has been due to his numerical fewness, his enforced contact with the white man, and his sharing in the rapid growth of the country; fears that his development would be to the loss of the white man have not been realized. The problems of segregation, violence, and the franchise have not yet been solved (the time being hardly ripe). Much help has been given by individual whites to blacks, and the Churches have been very active in many ways. The outline of educational work, supplied by Mr. Clark Foreman, shows steady and often rapid progress. Agriculture, industry, property ownership, health and similar agencies are reviewed, all showing successful achievement. The Inter-racial Commission provides an opportunity of discussion and co-operation with the Negro; the local committees are given much freedom, and they work on indirect lines as far as possible, co-ordinating and utilizing existing agencies; there are State Committees dealing with schools and colleges, and the public institutions; research and study are promoted, and a successful press service has been set up.

The Rev. Dr. J. Dexter Taylor deals with South Africa. Contacts go back to 1652, and at first humanitarian relations were maintained, but within a century abuses had appeared, and soon the welfare of the white was the paramount consideration. Slavery was abolished in 1807, and since then relations have improved, but are complicated by rival theories of imperial interference and of native capacity for civilization. Ultimate racial equality is now recognized by educational policy, but the problem of legislation is to provide for and keep pace with the gradual development of the native at his many stages of growth. The land and economic questions, in which the native now labours under heavy disabilities, are pressing; the colour prejudice shows itself as elsewhere in social and religious relations; there are differences of opinion as to educational and political ideals and methods. There is a useful summary of the work of Shepstone, Hofmeyr, and others, of recent legislation and Church efforts.

Mr. Galen M. Fisher discusses the relations between the yellow and white races on the Pacific Coast of North America. Since the eighties both Canada and the U.S.A. have practised restrictive policies and severely limited the number and the type of Oriental immigrant, and these have been inspired by fears of political ambition and economic competition and by colour prejudice in the spheres of religion and social life. The situation is very difficult, especially for the agencies who try to promote fuller and happier relations and of whom the greater number are Christian. The Churches have a Federal Council, and it has appointed a Commission on International Justice and Goodwill; the local Churches make special provision for Orientals, who are now frequently of the second and third generation; there are local Oriental Churches, often the fruit of an American mission; also Y.M.C.A.'s and Y.W.C.A.'s, Student Christian Associations, the S.C.M. and S.V.M. In addition secular agencies are at work: councils, clubs and residential houses for students. The impression given is that of much good and self-denying work severely handicapped by its conditions and therefore lacking the full success which it merits. The chief needs after the removal of prejudice are the creation of Oriental leaders in the Christian agencies, more autonomy and co-operation, more recognition of the second generation Oriental, and scientific study of the problem (an account of such studies already made is added).

In the Council's discussion and statement were raised the further points of the dangerous reaction on white ethics from a possible wrong handling of the situation; of the Fatherhood of God and the sanctity of personality as fundamental to the Christian position; of the loss to primitive peoples when Western influence destroys their social organization and religion and leaves nothing in their place; of Christianity as essential to the right solving of the problem; of the liquor and drug traffic; of financial and economic as well as political mastery; of special privileges such as extra-territoriality; of the need of studying the teaching of our Lord and His apostles in the face of racial problems; of the possibility of American negroes evangelizing their own kinsfolk in Africa; and the desirability of creating a world-conscience and world-standard.

S. P. T. PRIDEAUX.

(To be concluded.)

B

THE SHORTER ANGLICAN MISSAL*

THE publication of a Missal for the laity, after the events of 1927 and 1928, ignoring all that has happened and deliberately recommending Roman ways, will be construed as a challenge to authority and a cynical flouting of the Bishops' efforts to restore liturgical order. Needless to say, nothing of the kind is intended. Somehow or other good men contrive to reconcile the use of such a book with the obligations they undertook at ordination and institution. A reasoned defence of their position is unfortunately lacking. The arguments used at clergy house discussions seldom find their way into a printed form intended for consideration by scholars. It is all the more desirable that those who would not dream of using such a book themselves should try to understand it. Disregarding

* S.S.P.P. 1929. 6s. 6d.

much in the Proper of Seasons that invites criticism, let us study the structure of the Service, comparing it with the Roman Mass and the Alternative Liturgy of 1928. The five section-headings are as given in the Anglican Missal. It is worth remarking that the eightfold division of the 1928 Rite is at present academic, in that it is not reflected in current teaching and the Liturgy is not at present in use. In the table given on p. 230 a number of minor prayers, salutations, etc., are omitted.

The B Rite, which may fairly be called Anglo-Roman, is clearly an example of private judgment unthinkable in any Church except our own, where liturgical chaos has become almost normal. It is a hybrid with no justification in history. Note, however, that the Anglican Rite is given in its entirety; there is no *substitution* of Roman for Anglican material, though there is a change of order. The B Rite has considerable devotional value, and apparently no doctrinal implications other than those of the 1662 and 1928 Liturgies. The driving force behind it is the desire for enrichment on the part of those whose devotional life is based on the daily Eucharist and who find the Book of Common Prayer, though adequate, somewhat meagre. Part of the present misunderstanding in our Church is due to the fact that those who are content with a weekly Eucharist do not realize the devotional needs of those who attend a daily Eucharist. The C Rite will apparently not be the last word in 20th century English revision; the B Rite has no chance of being accepted as it stands. Is any form of compromise between B and C possible in the future?

1. A good deal of the additional matter of B comes under the head of private devotions. No one would suggest that the laity are debarred from using devotions taken from Roman sources, and a similar liberty must be conceded to the priest. The *Judica me* and *Confiteor** and the Last Gospel are private devotions before, or after, the Service. The Offertory prayers and the Secrets by reason of their length might conceivably be held to infringe the rubric of 1928 which orders that the private devotions of the priest shall not hinder or interrupt the Service. If so, they could be abridged. Presumably every one says some private prayers at this point and he would be a bold man who tried to improve upon the traditional ones.

2. The Introit, Gradual, etc., are legitimate when sung as hymns, for "Hymns and Anthems agreeable to Holy Scripture" are allowed. Do they become illegal when *said*? No, if we may argue from "Blessed is he . . .," which in C is described as "an Anthem which may be said or sung." If in the full sung Service such Anthems are legitimate, it is hard to see anything lawless in their recitation by the priest at a *said* Service, especially as the server may find them too difficult.

3. The 1928 Book sanctions the use of additional Collects before the epistle, and Collects said as Secrets and in the Post-Communion. See the Alternative Order: "He shall say the Collect of the Day. Other Collects contained in the Book or authorized by the Bishop may follow." "Collects, contained in this Book, or sanctioned by the Bishop, may be said after the Intercession, or before the Blessing." The order of the Secrets must be changed, to conform to the Rubric. The Secrets thus have a double sanction, being legitimate as private devotions or as additional Collects after the Prayer for the Church. Whether the particular Collects

* If this preparation is said aloud, by priest and people, according to the 1928 Book the *Confiteor* must be omitted.

A.— <i>Roman Mass.</i>	B.— <i>Anglican Missal.</i>	C.—1928.
I. Psalm 43 Confiteor Aufer a nobis, etc. Oramus te, etc. Introit Ninefold kyrie Gloria in Excelsis Collect[s] Epistle Gradual Gospel Creed	I. THE PREPARATION Psalm 43 Confiteor Our Father Collect for Purity We beseech thee, etc. Introit Ninefold kyrie or Commandments Gloria in Excelsis ["un- less it is to be said after the Post-Com- munion"] Collect[s] Epistle Gradual Gospel Creed	[A Devotion, without Confiteor. See Ap- pendix] I. THE INTRODUCTION Our Father Collect for Purity Threefold kyrie or Commandments or Gospel Summary Collect[s]
II. Offertory verse Suscipe Lavabo, etc. Secreta	THE OFFERTORY Offertory verse [as in A] } as in A The Prayer for the Church	II. THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD Epistle Gospel Creed THE OFFERTORY Offertory Verse
III. SURSUM CORDA, ETC.	III. THE PREFACE Lift up your hearts, etc.	IV. THE INTERCESSION [Collects]
IV. CANON Our Father The Peace of the Lord Agnus Dei	IV. CANON The two prayers of 1662, joined by "where- fore" Our Father The Peace of the Lord Agnus Dei We do not presume, etc.	V. THE PREPARATION Exhortation Confession Absolution Comfortable Words We do not presume, etc. VI. THE CONSECRATION Lift up your hearts, etc.
V. Communion of the Priest [and People] Ablutions Post-Communion Ite missa est Blessing Last Gospel	V. THE COMMUNION Communion of the Priest Confession Absolution Comfortable Words Ablutions Almighty and everliving God, etc. ["other col- lects sometimes pre- cede or follow this"] Blessing Last Gospel	VII. COMMUNION OF THE PRIEST AND PEOPLE VIII. THE THANKSGIVING Almighty and everliving God Gloria in Excelsis [Collects] Blessing Ablutions

given in the Anglican Missal are likely to be sanctioned is another matter.

4. Other divergences of B from C—the ninefold kyrie, and the displacement of the *Gloria in Excelsis*,* Confession, Absolution, etc., and of the Ablutions†—cannot be defended. (Though our musicians can be trusted to turn a threefold kyrie into a ninefold one at least!) However, they have no doctrinal significance, and many who feel bound to obey the Prayer Book would consider them improvements. Could they not be abandoned for the sake of peace on the understanding that at the next revision strong pressure will be exerted to secure these changes? But, even now, the ninefold kyrie might be considered one of the *minima* about which *non curat lex*.

5. The linking of the Prayer of Oblation to the Consecration Prayer by the word “wherefore” is surely uncontroversial. But what a commentary on the lack of interest shown by a section of Anglo-Catholics in the primitive Church when conflict with authority is faced for the sake of unessential borrowings from the Roman Mass and the absence of the Anamnesis‡ apparently causes no qualms!

W. K. L. C.

* A recent writer defended this on the ground that the omission of the *Gloria* at the end of the service is justified, on occasion, by tradition. It may then be added at the beginning as a hymn. Is there a better defence?

† Though some find the argument convincing that “if any remain” refers only to an abnormal quantity.

‡ The South Indian Scheme for Union provides that the Anamnesis shall be an essential part of the Eucharist; it also suggests singing the *Gloria in Excelsis* at the beginning of the service.

REVIEW

TEMPLE GAIRDNER OF CAIRO. By C. E. Padwick. S.P.C.K.
7s. 6d.

Anyone wishing to understand the meaning of the apostolic life in the modern world can find his desire answered in the story of Temple Gairdner.

His life, so clearly revealed to us in these pages, has the true apostolic quality. Outwardly uneventful, it is essentially heroic; full of happiness and joy, it is salted with sacrifice. Hedged in by much irksome detail, it is large and radiant with "the patience of the saints." Flashing with intellectual and artistic brilliance, it is utterly direct, self-forgetful, and unselfish. Shadowed by disappointment, it transforms every disappointment into a means of grace.

Temple Gairdner was the son of a distinguished Scottish doctor and of a mother from an evangelical home in East Anglia. At home, and at school, he received the discipline and encouragement which his strong, gifted, and enthusiastic nature required. Serious as a lad, and healthily devout, it was in the Christmas holidays of 1892, after his first term at Oxford, that he was called upon to face a blow which for ever settled the direction of his life. His younger brother, the special object of his love and care, died. "As I knelt by Hugh's bed," he wrote, "I first felt the necessity of putting Christ first and the rest nowhere." This meant that when he returned to Oxford he was, despite his natural inclinations, drawn into that set of fervent young evangelicals—among whom were W. E. S. Holland, A. G. Fraser, and J. H. Oldham—who by their zeal and vision have helped to transform the missionary outlook of the whole world during the last generation.

To square this sharp call to evangelism with the manifold interests and desires of his rich nature was no easy task for Gairdner. There was in him a "sense of form, a sacramental tendency, a natural Catholicism" which made the cruder expressions of evangelicalism distasteful to him. He had, in his second year at Oxford, "a difficult team to drive; his reading, which neither his sense of honour nor his mental hunger would allow him to shirk; his intellectual friends, and his musical friends; the boats; and now also the O.I.C.C.U., with its system of prayers and Bible readings, its group of comrades, and its clear, sharp, evangelistic programme."

A passion for self-scrutiny, never morbid, but terribly searching, began at this time and never left him.

"O God! Am I playing for my own hand? Alone with Thee, through life, the heat of men's praise will not burn me, nor the frost of their blame freeze me; I shall lose the craving for approbation and influencing men, and the grief at non-success. I am myself the reverse of all this. Faults still glaring—thoughtlessness, slovenliness, greediness? Well, *fast!*"

After Oxford, Gairdner first came under the influence of the great American evangelists and missionary leaders, John Mott and Robert Speer. It was at Keswick, after an address by the latter on August 1, 1894, that the following entry occurs in his diary: "Oldham and I walk up the road and give ourselves to God."

There followed a few years of enthusiastic work as a travelling Secretary of the Student Christian Movement, then in its formative period in the British Isles.

In 1899 he was ordained, and followed his friend, Douglas Thornton, to Egypt, going out under the ægis of the Church Missionary Society, "which through its station at Cairo was the most likely British Missionary Society to reach Khartum." The desire of the two men to reach Khartum was the fruit of their common enthusiasm for General Gordon.

What sent him abroad is most characteristically expressed in a note which he made after reading the story of the Passion: "The true appeal for missions is that if Christ prayed those prayers (the prayers of Gethsemane and Calvary), then of course the world must know."

At the end of his second year of service he wrote: "For me the die has been cast: the only way to peace and that self-realization which is indeed Salvation is, for me, the way of spirituality."

In 1902 came his marriage and the foundation of that home life, the supernatural happiness of which is Gairdnerishly suggested in a letter to a small nephew, "I am William's and Hugh's and Eleanor's and Douglas' and Patria's Daddy, that's who I mostly am."

These years witnessed student work in co-operation with Douglas Thornton, and the beginnings of the literary work which subsequently became the occasion of much joy and much cross-bearing.

On September 8, 1907, Douglas Thornton died, and Gairdner was left to fulfil alone the ideals and plans which they had wrought out in comradeship.

1910 was an eventful year, both for the Edinburgh Conference, to which he contributed a paper and a vivid account of the Conference itself, and because he was given a year's

leave of absence in which to devote himself to Islamic Studies. His travels, the friendships he made, and the encouragement given him by leading Orientalists in Europe and America, made a deep impression on him. But the hope of devoting himself wholly to Islamic scholarship for the glory of God was, through repeated disappointments, denied him.

The Great War brought the same dislocations and burdens to the Christian work in Egypt as in every other place, and Gairdner was immersed in work of all sorts and kinds.

With the coming of peace his artistic genius flashed out into the writing of mystery plays on Biblical themes, one of which was acted with deep and moving effect in church. Connected with this is one of those strange episodes in which human perversity is overruled to God's purposes. The Committee in London thought that if missionary supporters in England heard that plays were being acted in a church in Cairo they would withdraw their financial support, and Gairdner was consequently told that "this method of evangelism was costing too much of his time, and he must confine himself to simple colloquial plays (not in churches) for the peasants at the hospital."

How deeply this wounded a person of Gairdner's temperament and gifts probably God only knows, but in and through his acceptance of the disappointment he was enabled to enter that last phase of his life and apostolic ministry which we must believe is nearest to the heart of God. Its aim is characteristically expressed by Gairdner himself: "We decided to have one real shot at getting *on*: to take stock of our members, quasi-members, adherents, see who was who, have a campaign of explaining what the Anglican Church is, what it stands for in Egypt, what is its order, liturgy, aim, spirit: regularize, take hold, take stock, rekindle, and finally ordain the first Egyptian pastor, as a first step towards building up a really indigenous, non-foreign Church."

That might mean much, or it might mean next to nothing; under the leadership and inspiration of Gairdner it meant that a body of believers of diverse race and outlook was built up in love, and a shining example of Christian brotherhood was given to the Moslem world. What he began in the closing years of his life he sealed in suffering and death. In and through his weakness, the love and prayers of his people were abundantly drawn forth, and when he died, at Ascensiontide in 1928, they went on their way from his funeral with great joy.

The whole Church is under a debt of gratitude to Miss Padwick for showing us the life and death of her friend with

an artistic insight which is never at fault. Of Gairdner's life, and of this story of his life, we may fitly use the words which he himself used of his last illness:

"The whole thing is a song. Thanks be to God for His unspeakable Gift, and gifts."

E. R. MORGAN.

NOTICES

STUDIES IN EUSEBIUS. By J. Stevenson. Cambridge University Press. 6s.

This little volume, which was awarded the Thirlwall Medal in 1927, is a readable and useful study of several points connected with the life and works of Eusebius of Cæsarea. After a rapid sketch of the circumstances of the early life and environment of Eusebius, we are led on to consider how he fared during the great Persecution of Diocletian, and then finally to his theological position as disclosed at Nicæa and afterwards. This latter portion is the most valuable part of Mr. Stevenson's work, especially where he contrasts Eusebius's theology with that of Origen. Reference, however, might have been made to the Introduction to the *Church History*, and to the Panegyric at Tyre, in the tenth book of the same work, both of which passages illustrate Eusebius's leaning towards an Arian or semi-Arian position.

We are told that the volume before us was planned originally upon a much more ambitious scale, and doubtless this fact accounts for a somewhat disproportionate treatment of the many and various works which came from the pen of Eusebius. We should, for example, have welcomed a much fuller discussion of the *Church History*, the *Demonstratio Evangelica*, and the *Præparatio Evangelica*, which are so much more important than the rest. And we hope that later on Mr. Stevenson will find leisure to amplify, if not to complete, what he has here well begun.

J. E. L. OULTON.

A HUNDRED YEARS OF CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION (1829-1929). By Denis Gwynn. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION (1829 TO 1929). With an Introduction by His Eminence Cardinal Bourne. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

Mr. Denis Gwynn's *A Hundred Years* is a sequel to his *Struggle for Catholic Emancipation* (1750-1829), but deals almost exclusively with England. The history of the Roman Church in this country during the past century is simply, intelligently, and almost impartially related. The spectacular increase in numbers is shown to be due primarily to the influx of Irish Catholics during the famines of 1845-7, which happened to coincide with the submission of Newman and the first batch of converts from the Church of England. The old Catholics, barely "emerged from the Catacombs" (in Wiseman's phrase), timid, self-conscious, and Gallican in temper, were swamped by the horde of immigrants, and "the Catholic Church in England" became, as Manning found it, "virtually an Irish Church." (Indeed, it "still remains overwhelmingly concentrated in

the industrial areas, where the descendants of Irish immigrant labourers are still congregated.") But "the control of Catholic affairs remained almost entirely in English hands." Then, in the years following Manning's conversion, there came a period of violent internal conflict, which the author makes no effort to conceal. While the Irish immigrants remained mutely loyal, the English converts became dominant in the Church; but they were distrusted by the old Catholics, and divided among themselves. Manning was compelled to wrestle with Errington, with Ullathorne, with Newman, and with Acton, for the mastery; the *Tablet* and the *Month* hung on the flanks of the official *Dublin Review*: Newman embroiled himself with the Irish Catholics: while Manning's Radicalism, and, in later years, the Irish Question and the Education Controversy further complicated the situation. Mr. Gwynn, since he holds no brief for any individual, is able to do justice to the vanquished. After these storms came the comparatively tranquil days of Vaughan and Bourne; a period of steady leakage, counterbalanced, however, by steady progress. "The most important cause of Catholic expansion in Great Britain has undoubtedly been the prevalence of large families among the Catholic poor." This observation fills the author with encouragement: "In an age of universal suffrage, and of popular institutions, the argument of numbers is unanswerable." He is encouraged also by what he takes to be the failure and decline of the Established Church, whose necessity is Rome's opportunity: "the Catholic Church has acquired a growing prestige which increases as fast as the Established Church loses its hold upon the beliefs and traditions of the ordinary Englishman," and it will soon be able to spread from the industrial centres and sweep the rural districts. Here his conclusions seem to rest upon false premises, and he forgets that he has previously stated on p. xxi, "The Anglo-Catholic controversies, upon which Wiseman had counted for a rapid conversion of the whole Established Church, have long since ceased to be the principal factor in turning men's minds towards the Catholic Church. In the past fifty years it is, indeed, probable that there have been at least as many converts among Nonconformists as among members of the Church of England, while thousands of others have become Catholics who previously had no religious belief whatever." But it is, of course, to be regretted that upon three notable occasions the Roman hierarchy rose to the opportunity when the Anglican hierarchy demonstrably failed to do so, namely, in the Dock Strike of 1889, upon the capture of Jerusalem in 1918, and in the General Strike of 1926; although it is understood that there is another side to the last story, and one that must ultimately be told.

Mr. Gwynn's narrative is distinguished, as has been said, by the little that is suppressed. The omission, therefore, of any reference to the banishment of Mgr. Capel, "the Apostle to the Genteel," and of any reference whatsoever to Father Tyrrell, is the more surprising. "Bramford," on p. 104, is a misprint for "Brampford." The map, owing to the principle on which it is designed, is less illuminating than might at first appear. The other illustrations are well chosen. The allegation (p. 269) that *The Times* newspaper is consistently unfair where Catholic news is concerned, is not uninteresting. All things considered, this is an extremely fair and useful little book, and one that should meet the needs of a wide public in all denominations: but there is little in it that is new. It may be added that it bears no *imprimatur*.

Catholic Emancipation (1829 to 1929) is a *Festschrift* containing thirteen

essays by different hands, with a short introduction by the Cardinal-Archbishop of Westminster. The essays are almost without exception written in that cultured, modest, and gentlemanly tone which we have learned to recognize as characteristic of the Roman community in this island. The most interesting are those of Sir Bertram Windle on *The Catholic Church and Science* (with citations from Wiseman and from Archbishop Sheehan), and Father Thurston, S.J., on *Statistical Progress*. The latter reaches the conclusion that, in spite of leakage, "the development of Catholicism during the last eighty years has rather more than kept pace with the natural increase to which the vital statistics of the country bear witness." ("Sewston," on p. 248, should presumably be "Sawston.") Abbot Butler and Madam Maud Monahan write on *Religious Orders of Men* and *Religious Communities of Women* respectively, while Miss Margaret Fletcher reviews the history of Catholic feminism. Viscount Fitzalan contributes a thoughtful article on *Catholics in Public Life*, and enquires whether the laity might not be doing more for the political community of which they are members. (Mr. Gwynn has pointed out that the gains in Parliament have been principally in the House of Lords.) Sir John Gilbert's paper on *The Catholic Church and Education* is a useful summary of facts. Mr. Algernon Cecil is erudite upon *The Catholic Church and Literature*, and Mr. Oldmeadow entertainingly outspoken on *A Hundred Years of Catholic Music*. Archbishop Goodier, however, on *The Catholic Church and the Spiritual Life*, leaves a suspicion of inadequacy. It is true that some of the essays contain little beyond information that is accessible in works of reference, such as the *Catholic Directory*, but the majority offer genuine expressions of opinion. In the concluding essay, on *The Outlook*, this is carried to an extreme length. It was no doubt inevitable that the task of rounding off the volume should be entrusted to Mr. G. K. Chesterton: but his essay is the weakest in the book, and the facile cleverness of his invective strikes a discordant note amid the sober harmony of this compilation. Moreover, his defence of Romanism against popular Protestant objections, on the grounds that the doctrine of Purgatory is common to Islam, and images and incense to Buddhism and old paganism respectively, is no less surprising than his willingness to regard the Church of Rome as "for a season a sect among sects."

C. H. SMYTH.

LYNDWOOD'S PROVINCIALE: The text of the Canons therein contained.

Reprinted from the translation made in 1534. Edited by J. V. Bullard and H. Chalmer Bell. Faith Press. 5s.

Interest in Canon Law will be stimulated by this very timely production. The editors have unearthed an English translation made in 1534 of the Canons in Lyndwood's collection.

Lyndwood's original work was published in 1420, reprinted with a selection from his gloss in 1664, and again in complete form in 1676. The existence of an English translation of the Canons dating from the year of the passing the Act of Submission of the Clergy is highly significant. In the introduction to this volume, Mr. Bullard sketches the history of Canon Law in England to the time of the Reformation, and Mr. Bell discusses its status and applicability to present-day needs. Between them they succeed in making out a strong case for the theory that King Henry VIII. intended to complete the substitution of royal for papal

supremacy by abolishing all Canon Law in England which lacked English synodical authority. Whatever authority the Roman *Corpus Iuris Canonicae* may have possessed, nothing was to remain in force except the Constitutions of English Archbishops, which, in fact, formed the text of Lyndwood's book. These were admittedly incomplete, and the Act provided for future revision and enlargement.

So much, at least, can be admitted by the staunchest disciple of Maitland; and the Stubbs-Maitland controversy has no practical bearing upon the present situation. If anything like a complete body of Canon Law for the English Church is to be achieved, it is these canons which must form the foundation upon which such a codex is built up.

We have reason, then, to be grateful to Mr. Bullard and Mr. Bell for providing us with so handy a reprint. It is, however, a little puzzling to understand for what class of readers their book is intended. The editors mention "alterations in spelling and words as seemed necessary to make him easily readable." Since no notes on words so altered are added, a scholar can hardly make use of this volume with safety; while the ordinary Parish Priest will find the English difficult in places. Still the book should be purchased and read, for it is of first-rate importance.

Mr. Bell may like, if a second edition is called for, to modify the expression "falsifying of the text" (p. xlii). His argument would not be weakened thereby; and the book would be improved by an index. Half a page might have been devoted to a table of Archbishops with dates. Which of us, for instance, could date John Stratfort off-hand? Mr. Bullard, who, by his own admission, takes his pleasures sadly (cf. p. xxvi at foot), doubtless knows all these dates, but the reader who needs an English translation wants further assistance; while the careful inclusion of the operative Latin verb (*statuimus, decernimus, præcipimus ordinamus*) is useless without a note on the legislative force of each verb.

FRED G. ACKERLEY.

MOTHER EVA MARY, C.T. The Story of a Foundation. By Mrs. Harlan Cleveland. Morehouse Publishing Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.A., and Mowbrays, London. \$3.00.

This is the story of the founding of the Sisterhood of the Transfiguration in the American Church. The Order was founded on the Feast of the Transfiguration, 1898, in the diocese of Southern Ohio.

The Reverend Mother Eva Mary was the daughter of Justice Stanley Matthews of the United States Supreme Court. This biography relates her earlier life and the experiences which led her to found the Sisterhood of the Transfiguration. Mother Eva's childhood was a very happy one. She was one of those children who never want to grow up. She did not enjoy her girlhood, and she never cared for Washington society.

Mother Eva was subject to strict Presbyterian training in her youth. She came into the Church through the influence of her brother, Paul, who is now the Bishop of New Jersey. Paul, while studying at the Princeton Theological Seminary for the Presbyterian ministry, had read Lightfoot's *Notes on the Christian Ministry*, and it was that which first opened his mind to the possibility of a visible, historic Church—not necessarily Roman. Mother Eva, however, came to the Church more by means of her experiments in Catholic practice, than by the historical appeal. She began by keeping the day of the week on which her mother died as a fast day, and by praying for the dead. She spent

the winter of 1890 with her brother in lodgings at Oxford, and in that atmosphere she came to the complete acceptance of the Anglo-Catholic position, the three hours' watch by the Cross on Good Friday being the culminating act which brought conviction.

In 1907 Mother Eva made a pilgrimage to the English Sisterhoods. She makes this comment on the English: "After all, English reserve, when it melts into English liking, is immensely flattering, really much more so than American cordiality. We are cordial for our own sakes because we feel it to be due to us to be so, but when English people like you it is not because they want to be nice, but because they think you are."

Naturally, Mother Eva planned to enter a Sisterhood, and not to found one, but she was persuaded by the Bishop of Colorado to found a Sisterhood that would devote itself to the care of orphan children. From a very small beginning the Sisterhood of the Transfiguration has grown and extended, and before her death in 1928, Mother Eva saw the Sisters of the Transfiguration working with children in Hawaii and China, and receiving Chinese women into the Sisterhood.

The Bishop of Colorado in the Foreword to this book, says of the Reverend Mother Eva Mary: "There are three marks of saintliness which were discernible in her: there was a touch of the miraculous in the growth of the Order and the difficulties which it overcame; there was a lifetime of devotion to the service of Christ; and there was always the element of joyous good humor in all that she said or did."

FRANCIS J. BLOODGOOD.

BOOK NOTES

Altar Stairs. A little book of Prayer. By Joseph Fort Newton. Macmillan: New York. 7s. 6d. To one familiar with the severe simplicity and rigorous unity of the prayers of the Book of Common Prayer, the technique of the long, elaborate, ornate prayer, which ranges over a wide field, albeit along one path, is full of interest. There is much subjective rehearsal of the soul's needs, which mirrors, perhaps, to quote one of the prayers, "this strangely tangled time when confused cries echo through the world." Sincere, reflective, tender, poetic.

Teach us to Pray. By the Rev. Eric Southam, M.A. Mowbray. 2s. A series of broadcasted addresses on the Lord's Prayer and three other sermons. Lucid, simple, direct; marked by thoughtful consideration of the minds and needs of the scattered, listening audience. Will be found helpful by those who wish to study prayer and those who wish to teach it.

The Certainty of God. By James Gordon Gilkey, D.D. Macmillan: New York. 7s. 6d. The third volume of a series of interpretations of liberal Christianity by an American Congregational Professor. An appeal to life and experience with a view to deducing the nature of God. God is found in Nature, in the experiences of the mystics, in the fact of beauty, in the ultimate triumph of right causes, in conscience, in the fact of human love and self-sacrifice. Considerations which tell against the general argument are frankly acknowledged.

M. L. C.

The Hope of the World. By R. E. Roberts. Wells Gardner, Darton and Co. 3s. 6d. Mr. Roberts says truly that "the hope of the world lies much less in efficient systems than in personal character," and that character the Christian character, which is the ultimate proof of our Christianity. God wants not lawyers but witnesses. All that Mr. Roberts says is

quite true, but the force which should drive it home seems to be somewhat dissipated by being spread over a dozen short addresses on such varying subjects as The Supremacy of Christ, The Education of Children, God's Love and the Cross, The Ministry of Hymns, and International Peace.

The Gospel of Divine Personality. By W. S. Bishop, D.D. Faith Press. 2s. 6d. This is a series of addresses to an apparently non-theological audience, going little beyond John xiii. The author relies chiefly on Godet and Ellicott's commentary, and deals with the raising of Lazarus without quoting "I am the Resurrection and the Life." One instance will show his line of approach. On John v. he regrets the error of R.V. in omitting the passage about the angel troubling the water and "thereby rendering the curative properties of the spring more effective than at other times." The Seven "I AM's" are dealt with in part of an 8-page chapter. M. D. R. W.

The Christian Life and Message in Relation to Non-Christian Systems. Oxford University Press. 5s. This, the first volume of the complete report of the Jerusalem Conference, consists of papers prepared beforehand for circulation among the delegates to the Conference, and a résumé of the discussions which followed at the Conference itself. It will be of value to students of Religion, particularly for Dr. MacNicol's article on Hinduism and the invaluable contribution on Islam from the late Canon Gairdner, which represents the mature conclusions of one who spent a lifetime in close contact with Moslems and died at his post amongst them there in Egypt. But everyone will do well to read Dr. Rufus M. Jones' penetrating treatment of the Christian task in relation to secular civilization.

The Social Principles of the Gospel. Alphonse Lugan. Macmillan. 10s. A translation of the first two parts of the Abbé Lugan's *The Social Teachings of Jesus*. It consists largely of quotations, biblical and general, the former conventionally treated and accompanied by conventional deductions of an uninspiring nature. H. S. M.

Baptism, Confirmation, and the Holy Eucharist. By U. Z. Rule. Wells Gardner, Darton and Co. 3s. 6d. The author calls this simple exposition of sacramental history and doctrine An Eirenicon. It is one in the sense that it expounds the middle Anglican way as was customary in the later nineteenth century. Such recalling of familiar views can do nothing but good; there is always a fear of their going by default when newer, and therefore more interesting views are discussed. Mr. Rule lays much stress on the Scriptural foundation of Eucharistic doctrine, and upon the spiritual teaching of the early Fathers as contrasted with the hard literalizing of mediæval theologians.

The Excavations at Ur. By C. L. Woolley. Allen and Unwin. 1s. This short lecture will be valued by many as giving in authoritative form the evidence for a Deluge in Babylonia that closed one chapter in the history of civilization.

Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. By R. H. Tawney. Murray. 6s. This supremely interesting and valuable book is now published at a low price. No parish priest who wants to understand the age of "big business" in which he lives can afford to neglect this account of its origins.

W. K. L. C.